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Access to Effective Refugee Protection in South Africa: 
Legislative Commitment, Policy Realities, 
Judicial Rectifications?
RUVI ZIEGLER 
ABSTRACT: Just over two decades ago, South Africa (SA) adopted the Refugees Act 
130 of 1998 (RA), which incorporated the Republic’s global and regional international 
refugee law (IRL) obligations. For its time, the RA was progressive and advanced in terms 
of the scope and content of protection it provided for refugees. The coming into force on 
1 January 2020 of the Refugees Amendment Act 11 of 2017 (RAA 2017) substantively 
and detrimentally altered SA’s refugee protection landscape by severely restricting access to 
the asylum regime and by denying asylum-seekers substantive rights that were previously 
available to them. The amended RAA 2017 also withdrew status and protection from 
refugees, recognised as such under IRL. Indeed, many new provisions now arguably violate 
both SA’s international obligations and its Constitution.
Two decades after the coming into effect of the RA, this article critically appraises 
access to effective refugee protection in SA through an international refugee law lens. 
It argues that SA courts were forced to straddle between the legislative promise of the 
RA and Executive policies designed to limit access to asylum procedures and to deny 
asylum-seekers substantive rights. Courts have extended constitutional protection to 
those physically in the Republic, irrespective of their legal status in SA. They have utilised 
the principle of nonrefoulement, enumerated in s 2 of the RA, to bridge a protection gap 
between ‘asylum-seeker’ (per the RA) and ‘illegal foreigner’ (per the Immigration Act 13 
of 2002), ensuring access to the asylum process by requiring the issuance or renewal of 
asylum permits. Courts have also utilised the constitutional right to dignity to facilitate 
asylum-seekers’ (partial) access to substantive rights to employment, to basic medical 
care, to education, and to marry South Africans, which the Executive (through directives, 
regulations, and other policies) sought to deny them. Yet, generally, in their asylum 
jurisprudence, SA courts have not utilised IRL, let alone as the primary interpretive 
source, and they have refrained from pronouncing on policies’ incompatibility with the 
Republic’s international obligations in the light of the declaratory nature of refugee status.
The adverse effects of the RAA 2017 render inevitable its constitutional review. 
This article argues that, ‘armed’ with the much-strengthened interpretive role of IRL & 
International Human Rights Law (as mandated by the Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 
2008), SA courts must be prepared to declare certain RAA 2017 provisions (and their 
accompanying Regulations) as unconstitutional.
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I  CONTEXT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN ASYLUM REGIME AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A  Introduction
Just over two decades ago, South Africa (SA) adopted the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (RA), which 
incorporated the Republic’s global and regional obligations under international refugee law (IRL). 
In terms of the scope and content of protection it provided for refugees, the RA was progressive 
and advanced. The coming into force on 1 January 2020 of the Refugees Amendment Act 11 
of 2017 (RAA 2017) substantively and detrimentally altered South Africa’s refugee protection 
landscape, severely restricting access to the asylum regime and denying asylum-seekers substantive 
rights that had previously been available to them. Moreover, the amended RA withdraws status 
and protection from some refugees, recognised as such under IRL. Indeed, many of the new 
provisions arguably violate SA’s international obligations and its Constitution.
This article appraises over two decades of South African asylum jurisprudence. Its analysis 
reveals significant gaps between the Republic’s IRL commitments as expressed in the Preamble and 
substantive provisions of the RA and its policy realities for asylum-seekers — ultimately cemented 
by the enactment of the RAA 2017. Part I of this paper sheds light on the promise of refugee 
protection prior to the RAA 2017, juxtaposing it against actions of the South African Executive 
which have undermined and still do undermine access to asylum. Highlighting the prominent role 
of international law in SA’s constitutional framework, the article probes the insubstantial part that 
IRL has played in asylum adjudication until now. Part II appraises the courts’ endeavours to bridge 
protection gaps which the Executive’s policies have (often deliberately) created regarding asylum-
seekers’ process and substantive rights. Turning to the present and future, part III juxtaposes 
RAA 2017 provisions with IRL standards, as complemented and enhanced by international 
human rights law (IHRL), in five main areas: exclusion from refugee status; access to asylum; 
asylum processing centres and restrictions on movement; access to employment and education; 
and restrictions of political activities. In turn, part IV outlines three potential (non-exhaustive) 
constitutional grounds for challenging the RAA 2017 in SA courts: first, legislative inconsistency, 
irrationality, and the legality principle; second, disproportionate infringement of the Bill of Rights 
in view of SA’s treaty obligations; third, the RAA 2017’s manifestly retrogressive nature. Given 
the enhanced interpretive role of IRL & IHRL, pursuant to s 1A of the RA as amended by the 
Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008 (RAA 2008), a clash between fundamental IRL tenets and 
RAA 2017 provisions appears irreconcilable. It is contended that, when called upon, SA courts 
must be prepared to declare certain RAA 2017 provisions (and their accompanying Regulations) 
as unconstitutional. Part V concludes.
B  Legislative commitment
In 1954, Paul Weis bleakly described refugees as a ‘vessel on the open sea … not sailing under 
any flag’. In 2020, refugees seek legal recognition of their predicament pursuant to international 
standards; yet, it is national institutions, applying domestic legislation, to whom they most often 
turn for recognition and protection. In turn, host countries’ compliance with their international 
obligations occasionally gives way to national considerations, and effective protection of rights 
for refugees depends both on access to asylum and on judicial remedies for legislative infractions.
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On 12 June 1996, post-Apartheid South Africa ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention)1 and the 1967 New York Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol)2, the latter treaty removing the temporal 
and regional restrictions on the 1951 Convention’s application.3 Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention stipulates that the term ‘refugee’ ‘shall apply to any person who … owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’.4 
Earlier, on 15 December 1995, South Africa became party to the 1969 Convention Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention),5 which broadens 
the definition of a ‘refugee’ in the region beyond the 1951 Convention definition to ‘also 
apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin 
or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality’6 (emphasis added).
In 1998, SA enacted the RA, which came into force on 1 January 2000. The Act aims 
to ‘give effect … to the relevant international legal instruments, principles and standards 
relating to refugees; to provide for the reception into South Africa of asylum seekers; to regulate 
applications for and recognition of refugee status; to provide for the rights and obligations 
flowing from such status; and to provide for matters connected therewith’.7 Section 3 of the 
RA broadly adopts the OAU Convention’s expanded refugee definition to determine eligibility 
1 28 July 1951, 189 United Nations Treaty Series 150.
2 31 January 1967, 267 United Nations Treaty Series 606.
3 Apartheid South Africa had no legislative protection for asylum-seekers. J Handmaker ‘Public Interest Litigation 
for Refugees in South Africa and the Potential for Structural Change’ (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 65.
4 Or, in the case of stateless persons, if such a person is ‘outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events’ and ‘is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’.
5 10 September 1969, 1011 United Nations Treaty Series 45. Five African countries are not parties to the 1951 
Convention: Cape Verde, Comoros, Eritrea, Libya, and Mauritius. Libya and Cape Verde acceded to the 1969 
Convention whereas Comoros and Mauritius ratified it. Only Eritrea has not become party to either the 1951 
Convention or the OAU Convention.
6 Ibid art 1(2). This article does not address the substance of the refugee definition and interrelations between 
the OAU Convention and the 1951 Convention refugee definitions. See e.g. M Sharpe The Regional Law of 
Refugee Protection in Africa (2018) 86–88(Presents three alternative approaches: first, a sequential approach, 
whereby the OAU expanded definition is considered only if an individual does not qualify for refugee status 
under the 1951 Convention, which is linguistically supported by para 9 of the OAU Convention’s preamble 
and by the ordering of the definitions in art 1; second, the nature of the claimant’s f light dictates the 
definitional choice; and, third, an interpretation sensitive to pragmatic considerations, such as ‘mass-influx’ 
situations which may call for an art 1(2)) application). Regarding interpretive practices in SA, see e.g., T Wood 
‘Who is a Refugee in Africa? A Principled Framework for Interpreting and Applying Africa’s Expanded 
Refugee Definition’ (2019) 31(2–3) International Journal of Refugee Law 290, 302(Notes the Western Cape 
High Court judgment in Harerimana v Chairperson of the Refugee Appeal Board  [2013] ZAWCHC 209, 
(2014) (5) SA 550 (WCC), which held that the Refugee Appeal Board (RAB) erred by failing to consider 
refugee claims under the OAU definition. Wood suggests that this was ‘the continent’s first explicit judicial 
consideration of the [OAU] definition’s terms and application’.).
7 In addition see the Preamble to the RA, proclaiming its purpose is to ‘give effect to the relevant international 
legal instruments to which South Africa is party and the principles and standards relating to refugees contained 
within’. RA s 3 incorporates the above OAU refugee categories; s 3(a) adds tribe to the five 1951 Convention 
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for refugee status.8 The RA and its implementing 2000 Refugee Regulations (the 2000 
Regulations)9 generally follow the 1951 Convention’s structure, listing exhaustive grounds for 
exclusion from (s 4) and cessation of (s 5) refugee status, before turning to asylum procedures 
and ensuing rights. It could be argued that, by enacting the RA, SA was seeking to fulfil its 
IRL protection obligations in good faith.
C  Policy realities
Taking stock of two decades since the commencement of the RA, it appears that SA has 
significantly backtracked from that legislative commitment.10 It has done so through the 
adoption of restrictive policies, unfavourable position papers, and ultimately the enactment of 
the RAA 2017 which, as part III shows, contains serious breaches of IRL, as complemented 
by IHRL. The judgments considered in part II reveal that the Executive’s policies have 
curtailed effective access to asylum, inter alia, through pre-screening procedures; refusal to 
renew permits originally issued at another Refugee Reception Office (RRO) elsewhere in SA; 
closure of RROs and foot-dragging in implementation of court orders that instructed their 
re-opening, as well as corruption in their operation; and refusal to issue permits to delayed 
applicants.11 In terms of asylum-seekers’ substantive rights, the Executive has attempted to 
restrict access to employment, education, basic medical care, and marriage (at least) until and 
unless asylum-seekers are formally recognised as refugees. Moreover, in the light of declining 
refugee recognition rates (see part III), the refusal to issue asylum-seeker permits to appellants 
while their appeals are pending, coupled with significant backlogs in reviewing appeals, 
has left many in legal limbo. The Executive has also rejected asylum-seekers’ applications 
for temporary and permanent residence permits that would afford them greater security of 
residence. Concomitantly, detention practices have breached legislatively prescribed periods 
and the requirement to keep immigration detainees separately from criminal detainees. Most 
distressingly, SA authorities have attempted to deport persons whose cases were pending. The 
reasons of persecution; s 1(xxi) defines ‘particular social group’ in the 1951 Convention to include gender and 
sexual orientation.
8 The refugee definition in s 3 of the RA goes further than the OAU definition, adding the words ‘or disrupting’ 
to the ground of ‘events seriously disturbing public order’.
9 Refugee Regulations (Forms and Procedure), published on 6 April 2000 in Government Gazette No 21075.
10 Generally also see F Khan and T Schreier (eds) Refugee Law in South Africa (2014).
11 For historical context regarding RROs, see R Amit No Way In: Barriers to Access, Service and Administrative Justice 
at South Africa’s Refugee Reception Offices (2012), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3274020. Regarding 
corruption in the asylum process, see R Amit Queue Here for Corruption, Measuring Irregularities in South 
Africa’s Asylum System (2015), available at www.lhr.org.za/sites/lhr.org.za/files/lhracms_report-queue_here_
for_corruption-july_2015.pdf; R Amit Paying for Protection: Corruption in South Africa’s Asylum System 
(2015), available at www.migrationpolicy.org/article/paying-protection-corruption-south-africas-asylum-
system; R Amit & N Kriger ‘Making Migrants “Il-Legible”: The Policies and Practices of Documentation in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa’ (2014) 40(1) Kronos 269.
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above measures, which the 2016 Green Paper12 and 2017 White Paper13 broadly endorse, reveal 
an ideological turn from the welcoming spirit of the RA.
With refugee crises the world over, restrictive asylum policies may be (considered) 
electorally popular. Moreover, despite a history of persecution that is deeply embedded in the 
majority population’s consciousness, and despite the support that southern African countries 
offered to the liberation movement in the struggle against Apartheid,14 a 2018 Pew research 
survey revealed greater resistance to welcoming refugees in South Africa than in most surveyed 
countries. Responding to the question ‘thinking about immigration, would you support or 
oppose [your country] taking in refugees from countries where people are fleeing violence and 
war’, 48% supported the proposition and 50% opposed it.15 The year 2019 has also seen a 
resurgence of xenophobic attacks against migrants, including refugees, at a level not witnessed 
in SA since 2008.16
D  South Africa’s ‘international law friendly’ Constitution
The South African Constitution has been described as ‘international law friendly’.17 It 
pronounces that (all) courts must consider international law in interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights;18 that when interpreting legislation, courts must prefer any reasonable interpretation 
that is consistent with international law over any other interpretation19; and that customary 
international law (CIL) must be treated as law in SA, except where it is in conflict with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.20 Debates have arisen in SA as to the desirable 
12 Department of Home Affairs (DHA) Green Paper on the International Migration for South Africa (21 June 
2016), available at http://www.dha.gov.za/files/GreenPaper_on_InternationalMigration-%2022062016.pdf. 
As early as 2012, the ANC’s Peace and Stability: Policy Discussion Document (2012) 5 stated that ‘95% of 
asylum seekers came for economic rather than protection-based motives’, available at http://www.anc.org.za/
docs/discus/2012/peacev.pdf.
13 DHA White Paper on the International Migration for South Africa (July 2017) 27, available at http://www.dha.
gov.za/WhitePaperonInternationalMigration-20170602.pdf notes that ‘South Africa continues to receive a high 
volume of asylum seekers, and over 90 per cent do not qualify for refugee status’.
14 J Handmaker, Lee Anne de la Hunt, & Jonathan Klaaren (eds) Advancing Refugee Protection in South Africa 
(2008) 4(Notes that the new SA’s refugee policy was crafted by a government largely staffed by former refugees).
15 The EU median was: 77% support, 21% oppose (Hungary being the outlier: 32% support, 54% oppose). 
Elsewhere, globally, only Russia and Israel had worse refugee support levels, available at https://assets.
pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/1/2018/09/18141059/FT_18.09.19_AttitudesRefugees_Topline.pdf.
16 For example, see Human Rights Watch ‘South Africa: Punish Xenophobic Violence’ (13 September 2019), 
available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/13/south-africa-punish-xenophobic-violence. The South African 
Human Rights Commission launched an Inquiry on Violent Attacks Targeted toward Non-Nationals: With a 
focus on Long Distance Truck Drivers (concept note on file with author). For historical accounts see eg JP Misago 
‘Responding to Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Barking up the Wrong Tree?’ (2016) 2(2) 
African Human Mobility Review 443; S Mlilo and JP Misago Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: 1994-2018, An 
Overview (March 2019), available at https://www.xenowatch.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Xenophobic-
Violence-in-South-Africa-1994-2018_An-Overview.pdf.
17 E Cameron ‘Constitutionalism, Rights, and International Law: The Glenister Decision’ (2013) 23(2) Duke 
Journal and Comparative & International Law 389 (Notes that, instead of treating international law as an 
enemy, the Constitution embraced it). See also Law Society of South Africa v President of Republic of South Africa 
[2018] ZACC 51, 2019 (3) SA 30 (CC) at para 4 (suggesting that international law’s ‘centrality in shaping our 
democracy is self-evident’).
18 Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution).
19 Ibid s 233.
20 Ibid s 232.
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methodology of identifying relevant sources of international law21 and the (differential) 
weight22 to be accorded to binding and non-binding23 international instruments in interpreting 
the Constitution.24
Yet, these important challenges would not have ordinarily arisen when it came to the 
interpretation and application of IRL (and IHRL) in an asylum context, given the RA’s 
bespoke interpretive framework which enumerates the key treaty sources. Since its inception, 
s 6 of the RA has stipulated that the Act ‘must be interpreted and applied with due regard’ to 
the 1951 Convention, 1967 Protocol, 1969 OAU Convention, 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights,25 and ‘any other international human rights law instrument to which the 
Republic is party’.26 In turn, art 5 of the 1951 Convention stipulates that ‘nothing in this 
Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted by a Contracting 
State to refugees apart from this Convention’. Given the favourable general constitutional 
interpretive framework and the RA-specific interpretive instruction, one could have expected 
IRL, reinforced and complemented by relevant international human rights instruments,27 to 
have played a dominant role in SA courts’ asylum case law. Has it?
21 D Tladi ‘Interpretation and International Law in South African Courts: The Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
Al Bashir Saga’ (2016) 16 African Human Rights Law Journal 310, 336(Contends that, SA courts have, generally, 
struggled with the methodological questions of the interpretation and identification of international law. He 
argues that courts should apply the international rules of interpretation and identification of international 
law when dealing with international law, such as arts 26 (good faith) and 31 (interpretation) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which South Africa is not a party). See also Law Society (note 17 above)
(Notes at para 36 that ‘Although South Africa is not party to the Vienna Convention, it is bound by some of its 
major provisions…like article…26’).
22 Government of RSA v Grootboom [2000] ZACC 19, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 26(‘relevant international law 
can be a guide to interpretation but the weight to be attached to any particular principle or rule of international 
law will vary’).
23 S v Makwayane [1995] ZACC 3, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 35(Refers to ‘international agreements and 
customary international law’ as a ‘framework’ within which the Bill of Rights ‘can be evaluated and understood’ 
and thereby confirming its relevance to Bill of Rights interpretation).
24 The debate was largely prompted by the judgment in Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa [2011] 
ZACC 6, 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC). For discussion see J Tuvoninen ‘The role of international law in constitutional 
adjudication: Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa’ (2013) 130(4) South African Law Journal 661.
25 General Assembly A/Res/217(III) (10 December 1948). Article 14 proclaims a right ‘to seek and enjoy asylum 
from persecution’. Unlike a (growing) number of countries, South Africa does not have a constitutional right to 
asylum and has not constitutionalised 1951 Convention rights. For discussion see S Meili ‘The Constitutional 
Right to Asylum: The Wave of the Future in International Refugee Law?’ (2018) 41 Fordham International Law 
Journal 383.
26 South Africa is party to, among others, the core seven International human rights treaties: Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1966)(ICCPR); Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)(ICESCR); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)(CEDAW); Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (1989)(CRC); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1984)(CAT); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1966)(CERD); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006)(CPRD). Ratification details 
available at https://indicators.ohchr.org/.
27 Regarding the interrelations between IRL and IHRL, the key premise that guides this article, following a 
systemic integration approach to treaty interpretation, is that IHRL complements IRL and aids its interpretive 
construction. See e.g. V Chetail ‘Human Rights Law and Refugee Protection’ in C Costello, M Foster & 
J McAdam (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law (forthcoming) (positing that ‘no one 
contests today that, in states parties to the [1951] Geneva Convention, refugees are simultaneously protected 
by specialised treaties of refugee law as a specific category of international concern, as well as by generalist 
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E  Judicial rectifications?
South Africa is a major refugee-hosting country, predominantly from elsewhere in Africa.28 It 
has litigious civil-society organisations which have been making extensive use of constitutionally 
protected standing, extended to ‘anyone acting in the public interest’,29 and a (duly) expansive 
jurisdictional notion30 which accommodates legal challenges to measures such as those described 
in subsection C above at all judicial levels — High Courts, Supreme Court of Appeal, and 
ultimately the Constitutional Court (the Court).31 In their asylum adjudication over the past 
20 years, SA courts have been forced to square the protective premises of the RA with Executive 
policies designed to limit access to asylum procedures and to deny asylum-seekers substantive 
rights. In so doing, SA courts have extended constitutional protection to all those physically 
in the Republic, irrespective of their legal status.32 They have utilised the fundamental IRL 
principle of nonrefoulement, recognised in s 2 of the RA, to bridge a protection gap between 
an ‘asylum-seeker’ (per the RA) and an ‘illegal foreigner’ (per the Immigration Act 11 of 2002 
[IA]), enabling access to the asylum process through insistence on issuance or renewal of asylum 
permits. Courts have also construed the constitutional right to dignity to facilitate asylum-seekers’ 
(partial) access to employment, to basic medical care, to education, and to marry South Africans, 
which the Executive sought to deny through directives, regulations, and other policies.33
treaties of human rights law as a result of their applicability to all human beings’). Describing conflicts of norms 
between IHRL and IHL as ‘extremely rare’, Chetail argues IHRL ‘considerably enriches the material scope 
of international protection by granting a broad range of supplementary rights that are not guaranteed by the 
Geneva Convention’. IHRL’s role in interpretation of the refugee definition falls outside this article’s scope. For 
discussion see B Burson & DJ Cantor (eds) Human Rights and the Refugee Definition (2016).
28 In 2018, SA hosted 89 285 recognised refugees and 184 203 asylum-seekers, primarily from the DRC, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and Zimbabwe in Africa, and from Bangladesh and Pakistan in Asia. UNHCR, ‘Global Trends: Forced 
Displacement in 2018’ available at https://www.unhcr.org/afr/statistics/unhcrstats/5d08d7ee7/unhcr-global-
trends-2018-html. According to the DHA, on 30 June 2019, there were 186 210 s 22 holders — 60% of whom 
have had applications pending for more than five years. See ‘Answer to Parliamentary Question NW1586 of 9 
December 2019’, available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-question/12936.
29 Lawyers for Human Rights & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Another [2004] ZACC 12, 2004 (4) SA 
125 (CC) (LHR) at paras 14–15(Notes that s 38 of the Constitution ‘introduc[es] a radical departure from 
the common law in relation to standing’, including ‘expressly allow[ing] court proceedings by individuals or 
organisations acting in the public interest.’)
30 Ibid at para 26(Holds that the Constitution protects ‘foreign nationals who are physically in our country but 
who have not been granted permission to enter and have therefore not entered the country formally’).
31 Compare LB Landau & R Amit ‘Wither Policy? Southern African Perspectives on Understanding Law, “Refugee” 
Policy and Protection’ (2014) 27(4) Journal of Refugee Studies 534, 535 (Argues that, despite SA having some of the 
most progressive refugee legislation in the world, refugees and asylum-seekers are severely constrained in realising 
their legislated rights: legal failures cannot effectively be addressed solely through legal means).
32 LHR (note 29 above) at para 27(Holds that physical presence entitles persons to constitutional rights irrespective 
of whether their presence is legal, though refraining from determining whether ‘people who seek to enter South 
Africa by road at border posts are entitled to the rights under our Constitution if they are not allowed to enter 
the country’.) Also see Abdi & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others [2011] ZASCA 2, 2011 (3) SA 37 
(SCA)(Determines that asylum-seekers held at an inadmissible facility at a point of entry enjoy the protection 
of the RA and the courts).
33 Compare R Amit ‘(Dis)placing the Law: Lessons from South Africa on Advancing U.S. Asylum Rights’ (2018) 
20 Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law 1 (Argues that court victories prove hollow, given the DHA not only 
routinely fails to implement court orders, but also continues to engage in illegal practices, and suffers no 
repercussions for its defiance).
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Yet, in their asylum adjudication, SA courts have also practised a form of ‘decisional 
minimalism’34 that is ‘cautious, incremental, particularistic and theoretically modest’35 
regarding their use of international law. They have rarely (if ever) used the international 
instruments listed in the RA as their primary interpretive source. An analysis of the numerous 
cases referenced in this article reveals that only three judgments mentioned in passing s 6(1) of 
the RA’s ‘due regard’ interpretive requirement, and none have proceeded to consider properly 
its normative significance. Cursory references to s 39(1)(b) or s 233 of the Constitution 
notwithstanding,36 one is hard-pressed to find ‘real consideration’ of IRL (or indeed IHRL) 
treaties,37 let alone an ‘international-law-first approach’38 in which tenets of IRL are the starting 
premise for substantive appraisal39 and where, critically, the logic of international protection 
is applied. Indeed, some judgments merely allude to SA’s international obligations without 
spelling them out.40
Had South African courts seriously engaged with the s 6(1) of the RA interpretive sources, 
they would have sought to question the normative premise underlying the policy measures 
affecting asylum-seekers that they had been called upon to review: namely, that until and unless 
a person is granted refugee status, however long that process takes and irrespective of causes 
for delay, asylum-seekers are not entitled to substantive protections attached to (recognised) 
refugee status. Yet, a fundamental tenet of IRL is that ‘the recognition of refugee status is a 
34 Compare J Tuovinen ‘What to Do with International Law? Three Flaws in Glenister’ (2014) 5 Constitutional 
Court Review 435(Critiques the prominence of international law in that judgment in lieu of an engagement with 
substantive rights).
35 I Currie  ‘Judicious Avoidance’  (1999) 15(2)  South African Journal on Human Rights 138(Appraises the 
post-Apartheid Court’s first years). See also A Cockrell ‘Rainbow Jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 1(Suggests that in the early days of the Court’s jurisprudence, it was unable or unwilling to 
engage in the ‘first order moral and political reasoning’ that constitutional interpretation required).
36 For instance, see Minister of Home Affairs v Ruta [2017] ZASCA 186, 2018 (2) SA 450 (SCA) at para 31.
37 H Strydom & K Hopkins ‘International law’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa: Vol 
2 (2013) 30-11(Notes in general that, while South African courts have been referencing international human 
rights law, there is little evidence of ‘real consideration’).
38 Compare A Coutsoudis & M du Plessis ‘We Are All International Lawyers; Now What? Taking Seriously 
the Constitutional Injunction to Integrate International Law Obligations into South African Law’ (2020) 10 
Constitutional Court Review 155 (Presents a case for an international-law-first approach in constitutional 
jurisprudence).
39 Compare Mail and Guardian Media Ltd & Others v Chipu NO & Others [2013] ZACC 32, 2013 (6) SA 367 
(CC) at para 22 (Commences the ‘background’ section with an outline of the relevant international law norms 
and then returns to analyse the exclusion clause). In Tantoush v Refugee Appeal Board [2007] ZAGPHC 191, 
2008 (1) SA 232 (T) at para 112, the High Court noted that counsel for the applicant’s urged the court to adopt 
a contextual approach ‘having regard to the provisions and intention of the treaty … expressly mandated by 
section 6(1) of the Act’. In Tshiyombo v Refugee Appeal Board [2015] ZAWCHC 170, 2016 (4) SA 469 (WCC) at 
para 28, the High Court referred to the Act’s long title, Preamble, and s 6. Regarding burden of proof, Tantoush 
and Tshiyombo both reference the UHNCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
and Guidelines on International Protection (revised February 2019), at paras 196–197 and at para 37, respectively 
(UNHCR Handbook on Procedures).
40 For example, see Somali Association of South Africa & Others v Limpopo Department of Economic Development 
Environment Tourism & Others [2014] ZASCA 143, 2015 (1) SA 151 (SCA) at para 43(Notes that ‘the frustration 
experienced by the authorities as they deal with a burgeoning asylum seeker and refugee population must 
not blind them to their constitutional and international obligations’). Far fewer judgments refer to IHRL 
instruments. Compare T Daly ‘Kindred Strangers: Why has the Constitutional Court of South Africa Never 
Cited the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights?’ (2019) 9 Constitutional Court Review 387.
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declaratory act’,41 notwithstanding the practical significance of recognition.42 The UNHCR 
Handbook on Procedures famously postulates that 
A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the criteria 
contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee 
status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a 
refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of recognition but is 
recognised because he is a refugee.43
Section 1(v) of the RA, which legislative amendments including the RAA 2017 have not 
modified, explicitly adopts this principle by defining an ‘asylum seeker’ as ‘a person who is 
seeking recognition as a refugee’ (emphasis added).44 In turn, s 27(a) of the RA pronounces 
that a refugee ‘is entitled to a formal written recognition of refugee status’ (emphasis added).
Ultimately, it is because recognition of a person as a refugee is declaratory that asylum-
seekers must enjoy unhindered access to a fair Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process, 
lest they should be exposed to refoulement prior to having their claims assessed. 45 Having 
been granted such access, and following submission of an asylum application, asylum-seekers 
should be considered ‘presumptive refugees’46 until and unless their claim has been duly and 
finally rejected following a fair procedure. Therefore, the onus is on host country authorities to 
justify why asylum-seekers whose applications are pending should be denied access to rights 
that are otherwise available to refugees, rather than assume this should be the legal default. 
Administrative backlogs and staffing shortages should not be ‘rewarded’ by relying on them as 
a basis for denial of rights.47
Yet, in cases where SA courts have quashed restrictive policy measures as unconstitutional 
or instructed the Executive to (re)issue asylum permits, they have not sought to appraise the 
compatibility of policies with IRL as such by interpreting the enumerated sources in s 6(1) of 
the RA; nor have they predicated their analysis on the declaratory nature of refugee status. 
It is contended that, had courts engaged properly with the Republic’s treaty obligations, the 
protective outcome of certain judgments would be more durable: the normative foundations 
would have been laid for the inevitable constitutional appraisal of RAA 2017 provisions.
41 For example, see Preamble of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on Standards for the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as 
Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) OJ 2011 No. L337/9 at para 21. Furthermore, 
Ruta v Minister of Home Affairs [2018] ZACC 52, 2019 (2) SA 329 (CC) at para 27 alluded to the declaratory 
nature of refugee status by noting that both de jure and de facto refugees are Convention refugees.
42 C Costello ‘On Refugeehood and Citizenship’ in A Shachar, R Bauböck, I Bloemraad, & M Vink (eds) Oxford 
Handbook on Citizenship (2017) 729–730 (Posits that, ‘being protected against refoulement often generates 
precarity, as it does not bring with it a particular status for the non-removable person … the central concern of 
the Refugee Convention, as its full title indicates, is to recognise refugees as the bearers of a particular status’).
43 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures (note 39 above) at para 28.
44 In turn, s 1(xv) of the RA defines a ‘refugee’ as any person who has been ‘granted asylum in terms of this Act’.
45 UNHCR Note on International Protection (31 August 1993) at para 11.
46 J Vedsted-Hansen ‘Non-Admission Policies and the Right to Protection: Refugees’ Choice versus States’ Exclusion?’ 
in F Nicholson & P Twomey (eds) Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes (1999) 
269, 275. See also R v Uxbridge Magistrates Court & Another, Ex Parte Adimi [1999] EWHC Admin 765 at para 
16(Notes that art 31 (‘Refugees unlawfully in the country’) ‘extends not only merely to those ultimately accorded 
refugee status but also to those claiming asylum in good faith (presumptive refugees) is not in doubt’.).
47 For example, see J Hathaway The Rights of Refugees under International Law (2005) 158 (Argues that ‘genuine 
refugees may be fundamentally disadvantaged by the withholding of rights pending status assessment’.).
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Part II appraises core challenges to SA’s asylum policies over the past two decades. It reveals 
how courts have utilised the Constitution to bridge (some) protection gaps but have largely 
refrained from employing SA’s IRL obligations in their analyses, leaving the legal terrain (more) 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of RAA 2017.
II  TWO DECADES OF ASYLUM ADJUDICATION: GAPS-BRIDGING
A  The nonrefoulement conundrum
Two intersecting regimes govern the treatment and status of persons seeking protection in 
SA: the RA and the IA.48 The IA distinguishes between ‘foreigners’ and ‘illegal foreigners’. 
A foreigner ‘means an individual who is neither a citizen nor a resident but is not an illegal 
foreigner’. An illegal foreigner ‘means a foreigner who is in the Republic in contravention of 
this Act’ (emphases added). Whereas ‘foreigners’ holding an asylum-seeker permit (renamed 
‘visa’ for unspecified reasons by the RAA 2017) that is issued pursuant to s 22 of the RA are 
not considered ‘illegal foreigners’, those who, for procedural or substantive reasons, are denied 
permits or refused their renewal are at risk of deportation under the IA. As the Saidi and Arse 
judgments (see part IIB below) confirmed, in law, the mere refusal to issue or renew s 22 
permits does not necessarily authorise immigration authorities to subject an asylum-seeker to 
the wrath of the IA; yet, practically, refusal or withdrawal of a s 22 permit may expose such an 
asylum-seeker to risks of arrest, detention, and deportation.49
The challenge in respect of ‘illegal foreigners’ arises due to s 2 of the RA, which gives 
primacy to nonrefoulement ‘notwithstanding any provision of this Act or any other law to the 
contrary’.50 The consequences are profound: even ‘illegal foreigners’ are normatively shielded 
by s 2, leaving them in legal limbo: they cannot be refouled, but until and unless they are 
issued a permit they cannot enjoy the rights accorded to asylum-seekers in legislation and 
48 As amended by the Immigration Amendment Act No 13 of 2011. C Johnson ‘Failed Asylum Seekers in South 
Africa: Policy and Practice’ 2015 1(2) African Human Mobility Review 203(Argues that, de facto, the IA’s regime 
renders immigration prospects to SA unattainable to most — if not all — low skilled workers). See also C 
Johnson & S Carciotto ‘The State of the Asylum System in South Africa’ in M O’Sullivan & D Stevens (eds) 
States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Fortresses and Fairness (2017) 167(Points to an imbalance between 
‘restrictive immigration framework and the liberal refugee protection framework’).
49 Courts have considered challenges to detention practices of ‘illegal migrants’. Minister of Home Affairs v Rahim 
[2016] ZACC 3; (2016) (3) SA 218 (CC)(Holds that the MHA must have regard to international norms for the 
detention of those who fall foul of immigration regulation); Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister for Home Affairs 
& Others [2017] ZACC 22; 2017 (5) SA 480 (CC)(Holds that ss 34 (1)(b) and (d) of the IA violate s 35(2)(d) of 
the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to challenge detention in court, as well as s 12(1), guaranteeing freedom 
and security of the person, including the right not to be detained without trial; the declaration of invalidity was 
suspended for 24 months). For challenges facing migrants in SA generally see e.g. T Alfaro-Velcamp & M Shaw 
‘Please go HOME and BUILD Africa: Criminalising Migrants in South Africa’ (2016) 42(5) Journal of African 
Studies 983(Describes the criminalisation of migrants in SA through compelling them to purchase documents 
through illicit means, and the SA police service conducting raids and illegally detaining migrants).
50 Section 2 reads: ‘Notwithstanding any provision of this Act or any other law to the contrary, no person may be 
refused entry into the Republic, expelled, extradited or returned to any other country or be subject to any similar 
measure, if as a result of such refusal, expulsion, extradition, return or other measure, such person is compelled 
to return to or remain in a country where — (a) he or she may be subjected to persecution on account of his or 
her race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group; or (b) his or her life, 
physical safety or freedom would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination 
or other events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either part or the whole of that country.’
RUVI ZIEGLER
76 Constitutional Court Review 2020
judicial pronouncements. As the Ruta judgment stated, ‘[t]hough an asylum seeker who is 
in the country unlawfully is an “illegal foreigner” under the Immigration Act, and liable to 
deportation, the specific provisions of the Refugees Act intercede to provide imperatively 
that, notwithstanding that status, his or her claim to asylum must first be processed under the 
Refugees Act.’ 51
Part IIB considers the utilisation by courts of nonrefoulement to facilitate access to the SA 
asylum procedure. Part IIC turns to asylum-seekers’ substantive rights. Fundamentally, s 27 
of the RA stipulates refugees’ access to (certain) rights but speaks not of asylum-seekers — 
with the Executive’s default position being denial of such rights. Whereas the SA judiciary 
has extended many such rights to asylum-seekers, rarely has it utilised IRL tenets in so doing.
B  Access to asylum: jurisdiction, refugee reception offices, and asylum permits
1 An ‘inadmissible facility’ at/near the SA border
The first practical hurdle to accessing asylum procedures in SA is admission. Section 2 of the 
RA lists refusal of entry to the Republic as one of the manifestations of refoulement, following 
express stipulation to that effect in the OAU Convention (viz. the 1951 Convention). The 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held that asylum applicants in an ‘inadmissible facility’ at a 
Port of Entry (PoE) into the Republic enjoy the protection of the RA and of the courts, and 
that they should be given ‘every reasonable opportunity’ to apply.52 Importantly, the court 
postulated that ‘refusing a refugee entry to this country, and thereby exposing her or him to the 
risk of persecution or physical violence in his home country is in conflict with the fundamental 
values of the Constitution.’53
2 Issuance of appointment slips and ‘pre-screening’ procedure
For in-country applicants, the key challenge to effective protection from refoulement is having 
access to an RRO where a Refugee Status Determination Officer (RSDO) issues them an 
asylum-seeker permit. Section 21 of the RA stipulates that ‘An application for asylum must be 
made in person in accordance with the prescribed procedures to a Refugee Reception Officer 
at any Refugee Reception Office’. In turn, officers are required to assist asylum seekers in filling 
out their applications and to issue them permits.54
Yet, in the early 2000s, the Johannesburg and Pretoria RROs implemented two policies 
that undermined access to the asylum procedure: first, an ‘appointment system’ whereby 
applicants were given an appointment slip dated as far away as six months to a year; until 
their appointment date, applicants would remain ‘illegal foreigners’ and potentially liable 
to be arrested, detained, and deported pursuant to ss 32, 33 and 34 of the IA. Second, a 
‘pre-screening’ process whereby applicants had to fill a form at a RRO car park without any 
assistance and without the benefit of interpreters; the form had two questions (why they were 
applying for asylum, and why they left their country/what would happen if they returned) 
and, based on their answers, RSDOs made decisions in their cases. The Transvaal High Court 
held both policies to be ‘unconstitutional and unlawful in respect of the manner of scheduling 
51 Ruta (note 41 above) at para 43.
52 Abdi (note 32 above).
53 Ibid at para 2.
54 RA s 21 regulating the issuance of s 22 permits.
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appointments and in respect of the pre-screening method adopted’.55 It emphasised that 
‘[n]o amount of administrative inconvenience can absolve the respondents of their legal and 
constitutional responsibility’.56 Disappointingly, an appointment slip system was introduced 
in 2018 at the Port Elizabeth RRO, resulting in yet another successful court challenge.57
3 Refusal to renew a permit originally issued at another RRO
Many asylum-seekers will have entered SA, received an asylum permit at an RRO in one part 
of the country, and landed up residing elsewhere, for family or employment reasons. The Cape 
Town RRO (CTRRO) refused to renew asylum permits issued at other RROs, leaving asylum-
seekers in possession of expired permits, susceptible to immigration control. The policy was 
successfully challenged,58 yet the Western Cape High Court judgment, ordering the renewal 
of permits, remains overshadowed by the failure to re-open the CTRRO (see part IIB5 below).
4 Staffing shortages at RROs
Access to the asylum process was further curtailed by rationing daily application numbers 
at RROs. In Kiliko,59 Congolese citizens argued that the CTRRO accepted only 20 asylum 
applications each day. Rejecting this policy, the High Court held that ‘foreigners were entitled 
to all the fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, save those specifically reserved for 
South African citizens’ and that their ‘illegal foreigner’ status (absent s 22 permit) ‘impacted, or 
threatened to impact’ on their ‘right to human dignity’ and on their ‘freedom and security’.60 
It emphasised that SA ‘was obliged, in terms of the international instruments to which it was 
a party [without specifying which], the Refugees Act and the provisions of ss 7(2) and 195 
of the Constitution, to provide adequate facilities to receive, expeditiously consider and issue 
asylum-seeker permits.’ 61
5 Closure of RROs in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth
Given SA’s manifold Points of Entry (PoEs),62 ensuring effective access to asylum requires 
operating RROs throughout the Republic. Before 2011, there were six active RROs: 
Johannesburg, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, Durban, and Musina (close to the 
Zimbabwean border). Yet, in May 2011, the Johannesburg RRO closed entirely, in October 
2011 the Port Elizabeth RRO closed to new applicants, and in July 2012 the CTRRO closed 
to new applicants. Consequently, asylum-seekers already in SA, residing in the Western and 
Eastern Cape, had to frequently travel to Pretoria, Durban or Musina to renew their permits; 
55 Tafira v Ngozwane 2006 ZAGPHC 136 (TPD) at 46.
56 Ibid at 22.
57 Huda & Another v Minister of Home Affairs (PEHC, unreported case no. 2434/2019).
58 Ntumba Guella Nbaya v Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs (WCHC, unreported case no. 
6534/15) (copy with author)(Re challenges arising for families due to difficulties regarding marriage certificates). 
See also Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town v Minister of Home Affairs (WCHC, unreported case no. 5242/2016) 
(copy with author) discussed in K Moult ‘Sally Gandar and Popo Mfubu: on the record’ (2019) 68 South Africa 
Crime Quarterly 41(Challenges joint application procedures for families).
59 Kiliko & Others v Minister of Home Affairs & Others [2008] ZAWCHC 124, 2006 (4) SA 114 (C).
60 Ibid at paras 27–28.
61 Ibid at para 28.
62 A list of PoEs is available at http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/immigration-services/south-african-ports-of-entry.
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and applicants arriving through Western and Eastern Cape PoEs and issued there, as required, 
an asylum transit permit, had to travel significant distances at great expense within a short 
period to avoid becoming ‘illegal foreigners’.
The closures of RROs in Port Elizabeth and Cape Town prompted judicial challenges 
(two in the case of the latter) that ultimately led courts to order their re-opening.63 In Somali 
Association,64 the SCA noted in respect of the closure of the Port Elizabeth PoE that ‘[T]he 
asylum application process is invariably a protracted one. Timely access to an RRO is thus 
critical not just for asylum seekers to legalise their stay in this country, but also for the effective 
protection of their rights.’65 The SCA highlighted the adverse effect of the [Port Elizabeth] 
RRO closure on ‘asylum-seekers’ ability to choose their place of residence, not least in light 
of their need to join family, acquaintances and communities that are already established and 
who are able to help support them on arrival’.66 The court stated that ‘repeated visits to a 
distant RRO also have the potential to jeopardise the employment and job security of an 
asylum seeker.’67
As for the closure of the CTRRO, in Scalabrini (I), the SCA was reticent to order its 
re-opening: instead, it required the Director-General to consult with interested parties. The 
SCA was sympathetic to the respondents, noting that ‘[t]he obligations of the government to 
refugees are neither unrestrained nor unconfined. The material resources of governments are 
limited.’ According to Willis J, there cannot be, inherently, a ‘legitimate expectation … on the 
part of anyone to have an RRO in any specific geographic location in the country, including 
Cape Town’.68 The judgment gave the Director-General time to consult with interested parties 
before deciding on the future of the RRO.
Several years of closure on, a second challenge ensued (Scalabrini (II)69). This time, the 
SCA ordered the re-opening of the CTRRO by 31 March 2018 ‘to ensure the immediate 
protection of their [asylum-seekers’] rights and the determination of their status in accordance 
with international standards’.70 The DHA Director-General argued that ‘refugee services were 
being abused by economic migrants’ since 77% of applications at that office were rejected’. The 
SCA rejected this claim, noting that, on its own terms, the statement implies ‘denial of access to 
a refugee reception office to 23% of genuine asylum seekers’ and, consequently, denying them 
63 At the time of writing, despite the SCA order in Scalabrini (II) (note 69 below), the CTRRO had still not 
received any new applications: Reply to Question NW1456 to the Minister of Home Affairs (24 December 2019)
(Notes that a lease agreement could not be finalised and that once finalised the building obtained will need to be 
refurbished before the office can be re-opened). Moreover, despite the Nbaya court order, the CTRRO initially 
refused to renew asylum-seekers’ permits issued at other RROs. It then began renewing such permits with one 
month’s validity, until such time as the relevant asylum file was transferred to the CTRRO. Meanwhile, asylum-
seekers whose permits had expired were taken to the police station; were required to attend a court hearing; 
and issued with an ‘admission of guilt’ fine. The Scalabrini Centre launched litigation in respect of both the 
failure to comply with Scalabrini (II) and the failure to properly implement Nbaya, seeking the appointment of 
a Special Master to oversee DHA compliance (copy on file with author).
64 Minister of Home Affairs & Others v Somali Association of South Africa Eastern Cape & Another [2015] ZASCA 
35, 2015 (3) SA 545 (SCA).
65 Ibid at para 4.
66 Ibid at para 28.
67 Ibid at para 29.
68 Minister of Hone Affairs & Others v Scalabrini Centre [2013] ZASCA 134, 2013 (6) SA 421 (SCA) at para 84.
69 Scalabrini Centre & Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [2017] ZASCA 126, 2018 (4) SA 125 (SCA).
70 Ibid at para 35.
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economic opportunities in Cape Town; it held that the RA ‘reveals a clear, general orientation 
towards the protection of the rights of asylum seekers and refugees and their integration into 
South African society’.71
The CTRRO closure effectively imposed restrictions on asylum-seekers and refugees’ choice 
of place of residence. The Scalabrini (II) judgment included a rare reference in South African 
jurisprudence to a substantive right in IRL, art 26 of the 1951 Convention, which stipulates 
that ‘refugees lawfully in [the asylum country’s] territory’ should have ‘the right to choose their 
place of residence and move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to 
aliens generally in the same circumstances’.72 The SCA also referenced (but did not discuss) 
the interpretive requirement in s 6 of the RA.73 The judgment did not appraise, as per art 26, 
whether asylum-seekers and refugees are ‘generally in the same circumstances’ as other ‘aliens’ 
on whom such effective residence restrictions are not imposed.
6 Refusal to issue a permit to a delayed applicant
The Court in Ruta74 considered the legal ramifications of a 15 months’ delay in submitting 
an asylum application. Logically, the declaratory nature of refugee status must be front and 
centre of any such legal assessment, given that a decision to deny an applicant access to the 
asylum system merely on lateness grounds could effectively deny a 1951 Convention refugee 
status — and protection. The applicant, a Rwandan who entered SA irregularly via Zimbabwe, 
sought to apply for asylum following his arrest for a driving offence. In a compelling judgment, 
Cameron J held that a delay ‘did not diminish his [Ruta’s] entitlement to apply’75 even though 
‘[i]t is a crucial factor in determining credibility and authenticity’.76
The judgment’s reasoning heavily relies on the primacy of nonrefoulement within the RA 
structure. Moreover, the judgment acknowledges, though does not explicitly reference, the 
IRL notion of refugees sur place77 who ‘enter the country of refuge on one basis’ but ‘thereafter 
supervening events in their country of origin involuntarily render them refugees’ in respect of 
whom ‘delayed’ applications are a built-in feature of their predicament.78 The judgment also 
recognises that ‘[a]sylum seekers do not arrive only where they should, nor do they always 
have the opportunities and agency to claim what they should’, yet it misses an opportunity to 
apply the non-penalisation principle in art 31(1) of the 1951 Convention, which enjoins host 
71 Ibid at para 61.
72 Ibid at para 33 (Schippers AJA). Notably, SA has made no reservations to the application of 1951 Convention 
provisions; compare N Maple Rights at Risk: A Thematic Investigation into how States Restrict the Freedom of 
Movement of Refugees on the African Continent (2016) App 1: Table 4 (Seven African countries made reservations 
to art 26). For discussion of effective restrictions on movement due to being tied to an RRO see F Khan & M 
Lee ‘Policy Shifts in the Asylum Process in South Africa Resulting in Hidden Refugees and Asylum Seekers’ 
(2018) 4(2) African Human Mobility Review 1205.
73 Ibid at para 19.
74 Ruta (note 41 above).
75 Ibid at para 4.
76 Ibid at para 56.
77 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures (note 39 above) at paras 94–96. Re refugees sur place, see also AI v Director 
of Asylum Seeker Management [2019] ZAWCHC 114 (2 September 2019)(States that the DHA must issue an 
asylum seeker permit to Burundian nationals whose initial applications for refugee status had been rejected, but 
who wished to lodge sur place applications).
78 Ruta (note 41 above) at para 51.
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countries from imposing penalties on refugees for their unlawful entry or presence, provided 
certain criteria are met (for discussion, see part IIIB).
7 Refusal to renew permits for asylum appellant
Saidi79 concerned the CTRRO’s refusal to renew the applicants’ permits as they were awaiting 
the outcome of judicial reviews, following rejections of their asylum applications by RSDOs 
and failed appeals. The Court held by a majority (Jafta J dissenting) that s 22(3) of the RA 
mandates an RSDO to extend asylum-seekers’ permits where the outcome of their application 
(read to mean final determination80) is pending; the judgment interpreted the word ‘may’ in the 
provision to mean ‘must’. The judgment reiterated that ‘[w]ithout a temporary permit, there is 
no protection. This runs counter [to] the very principle of non-refoulement and the provisions 
of section 2’.81 It emphasised that permits ‘prevent undue disruption of a life of human dignity 
… and communing in ordinary human intercourse without undue state interference’.82
The Court emphasised that ‘courts must adopt a purposive reading of statutory provisions’, 
noting the RA requires its interpretation to be made with ‘due regard’ to 1951 Convention,83 
and referencing the s 233 constitutional requirement; yet, it did not frame the requirement 
to issue or extend s 22 of the RA permits in terms of a nonrefoulement obligation pursuant 
to art 33 of the 1951 Convention. Nevertheless, its judgment does cite (approvingly) Pinto 
de Albuquerque J’s endorsement of the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures stipulation that 
‘the determination of refugee status is merely declaratory’ in his separate opinion in Hirsi (a 
European Court of Human Rights judgment concerning interdiction at sea).84
8 Refusal to (re)issue permits to detainees
It was noted above that absent a s 22 permit, asylum-seekers as ‘illegal foreigners’ are susceptible 
to detention. Indeed, s 23(2) of the IA provides that ‘[d]espite anything contained in any 
other law’ the holder of an asylum transit permit becomes, on expiry of the permit, an ‘illegal 
foreigner’ liable to be dealt with under the IA. Yet, s 21(4) of the RA stipulates that ‘[n]
otwithstanding any law to the contrary, no proceedings may be instituted or continued against 
any person in respect of his or her unlawful entry into or presence in the country if that person 
has applied for asylum in terms of section 21(1) until a decision has been made on his or her 
application and that person has had an opportunity to exhaust his or her rights of review or 
appeal in terms of the Refugees Act’.
In Arse,85 the SCA ordered release from detention of an Ethiopian asylum-seeker whose 
permit had expired and whose application for asylum had been rejected by an RSDO but 
79 Saidi v Minister of Home Affairs & Another [2018] ZACC 9, 2019 (1) SA 1 (CC).
80 Ibid at para 20.
81 Ibid at para 30.
82 Ibid at para 18.
83 Ibid at para 29.
84 Ibid at para 34. App No 27765/09 Hirsi Jamaa v Italy (GC) (23 February 2012) at pages 64–66. The judgment 
found that, Italy had breached its nonrefoulement obligations arising from art 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 4 November 1950, 213 United Nations Treaty Series 221, by intercepting at sea boats carrying 
Somalis and Eritreans and then returning to Libya without examining their protection claims, thereby exposing 
them to a risk of ill-treatment.
85 Arse v Minister of Home Affairs [2010] ZASCA 9, 2012 (4) SA 544 (SCA).
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whose appeal was pending before the RAB. The SCA also ordered that he be issued with an 
asylum permit which would be valid until the final adjudication of an asylum claim, including 
all rights of appeal and review. Attempting to reconcile the two provisions, the SCA held that 
s 23(2) of the IA ‘ceases to be of application when an asylum seeker permit is granted to an 
‘illegal foreigner’’.86
Bula87 concerned the fate of 19 Ethiopian asylum-seekers who had arrived in Johannesburg 
and were detained shortly thereafter. After their transfer to the Lindela holding facility, and 
following a meeting with Lawyers for Human Rights, they had written to the DHA seeking 
to halt their impending deportation, demanding their release and an opportunity to apply for 
asylum. Absent a response, they sought judicial review. The SCA held that, ‘once an intention 
to apply for asylum was evinced, the protective provisions of the RA…come into play and the 
asylum seeker is entitled as of right to be set free subject to the provisions of the [Refugees] 
Act’.88 It thus interdicted the Executive from deporting the applicants, declared their detention 
unlawful, ordered their release, and authorised their lawful stay for 14 days in order to apply 
for asylum at an RRO — where they would be issued a s 22 permit.
Ersumo89 involved an Ethiopian asylum-seeker who was detained after failing, before his 
arrest, to obtain a permit due to queues (first) at the Pretoria RRO and (subsequently) at 
CTRRO. The SCA noted that, while reg 2(1) of the 2000 Regulations stipulates that an 
application must be submitted without delay, neither it nor the RA prescribes a time for such 
submission.90 The SCA ordered issuance of an asylum transit permit (which at the time was 
valid for 14 days), release from detention, and priority at the Port Elizabeth RRO; and, upon 
submission of an asylum application, the issuance of a s 22 asylum permit.91
C  Asylum-seekers’ rights and the constitutional role of dignity
1 The constitutional right to dignity and its application to asylum-seekers
Part IIB surveyed judicial responses to the Executive’s attempts to curtail asylum-seekers’ access 
to asylum procedures. This paragraph turns to its endeavour to deny asylum-seekers access to 
substantive rights which others, including recognised refugees, enjoy. It is contended that, 
rather than rely on IRL principles to compel authorities to guarantee such rights, courts have 
opted for utilisation of the constitutional right to dignity in s 10 of the Bill of Rights, which 
provides: ‘Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected.’ Yet, absent constitutional articulation of asylum-specific rights, reliance on IRL 
tenets would have buttressed protection claims, rendering them more resilient to prospective 
challenges.
Early on in its asylum jurisprudence, the Court clarified the scope of applicability of 
constitutional rights. In its Lawyers for Human Rights judgment, it held that they apply 
to ‘human beings who are physically inside the country at sea or airports’, given that the 
determination of the question whether a person is an illegal foreigner ‘could adversely affect 
86 Ibid at para 19.
87 Bula v Minister of Home Affairs [2011] ZASCA 209, 2012 (4) SA 560 (SCA).
88 Ibid at para 80.
89 Ersumo v Minister of Home Affairs [2012] ZASCA 31, 2012 (4) SA 581 (SCA).
90 Ibid at para 15.
91 Ibid at para 21.
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not only the freedom of the people concerned but also their dignity’.92 The Tsebe judgment, 
upholding a lower court’s proscription of extradition to Botswana, emphatically stated: ‘The 
human rights provided for in sections 10, 11 and 12 of our Constitution are not reserved for 
only the citizens of South Africa. Every foreigner who enters our country — whether legally 
or illegally — enjoys these rights and the State’s obligations contained in section 7(2) are not 
qualified in any way.’93
Subsection 2 explores judgments concerning asylum-seekers’ access to substantive rights; 
and subsection 3 addresses attempts to restrict their eligibility for less precarious legal statuses.
2 Access to substantive rights: employment, education, and marriage
Section 27 of the RA enumerates rights to which (recognised) refugees are entitled. Inter alia, 
a refugee (b) ‘enjoys full legal protection, which includes the rights set out in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution and the right to remain in the Republic in accordance with the provisions of this 
Act’.’94 Refugees are also entitled to an identity document, SA travel document, and the rights 
to ‘seek employment’ and to enjoy ‘the same basic health services and basic primary education 
which the inhabitants of the Republic receive from time to time’. 95
Notably, nothing in the RA enjoins asylum-seekers qua s 22 permit holders from accessing 
the s 27 enumerated rights. Yet, the Executive has sought to differentiate between asylum-
seekers and refugees, reluctantly acknowledging the latter’s statutory entitlements while denying 
them to the former, in respect of employment (both wage-earning and self-employment), 
education, medical care, and marriage. When courts extended important substantive rights to 
asylum-seekers, the basis for their intervention was the effect that restrictions would have on 
asylum-seekers’ human dignity. However, had they given ‘due regard’ to IRL tenets, particularly 
the normative ramifications of the declaratory nature of refugee status, courts would have been 
able to rely on the 1951 Convention to bolster protection for asylum-seekers. For instance, 
regarding employment, art 17 of the 1951 Convention guarantees refugees ‘lawfully staying’ 
access to wage-earning employment, whereas pursuant to art 18 access to self-employment 
should materialise as soon as a refugee is ‘lawfully’ in the country.96 Regarding education, 
Article 22 accords to ‘refugees’ without temporal or others qualifications ‘the same treatment 
as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education’.
Prior to the commencement of the RAA 2017, asylum-seekers’ access to employment 
and education in SA was predicated on Watchenuka.97 The judgment concerned a Congolese 
widow, trained and qualified as a pharmacy technician, who entered SA from Zimbabwe with 
her disabled 20 year old son. Shortly after applying for asylum, she secured a place for her son 
to study at a Cape Town college; she sought employment to support him and herself. Alas, 
the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs (SCRA) prohibited asylum-seekers and their 
92 LHR (note 29 above) at paras 20, 26.
93 Minister of Home Affairs v Tsebe [2012] ZACC 16, 2012 (5) SA 467 (CC) at para 65. See also Tantoush (note 39 
above) at para 64 (Notes the equal application of the Bill of Rights to ‘foreigners’ and citizens).
94 RA s 27(b).
95 RA ss 27(d), (e, (f) and (g), respectively.
96 1951 Convention arts 17 and 18 respectively. Part IIIE considers whether RAA 2017 provisions that explicitly 
restrict asylum-seekers’ access to employment and education are compatible with IRL.
97 Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka [2003] ZASCA 142, 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA).
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family members from taking up employment and from studying during the first six months 
of holding a s 22 permit.
While the SCA rejected SCRA’s blanket prohibition policy, it accepted the premise that 
‘the right to enter and to remain in the Republic, and the right to choose a trade or occupation 
or profession, are restricted to citizens by ss 21 and 22 of the Bill of Rights’. Notably, both 
provisions commence with the phrase ‘every citizen’; nevertheless, had the SCA employed a 
purposive interpretation of the provisions in light of enumerated IRL treaty rights, it could 
have construed such provisions as a requirement to ensure such rights to citizens, rather than 
as a constitutional permission to restrict access to such rights only to citizens. Under such 
construction, SA authorities would be required to justify exclusion of asylum-seekers from 
access to employment, comparing and contrasting them with other non-citizens — including 
recognised refugees — who enjoy such access.
The SCA opted instead to appraise the effect of destitution on human dignity, rendered by 
denial of employment and of access to education. For ‘human dignity has no nationality. It 
is inherent in all people — citizens and non-citizens alike — simply because they are human. 
And while that person happens to be in this country — for whatever reason — it must be 
respected, and is protected, by section 10 of the Bill of Rights’.98 The SCA held that the general 
prohibition on asylum-seekers’ access to employment ‘is a material invasion of human dignity 
that is not justifiable in terms of section 36 [of the Constitution]’ given that asylum-seekers 
are offered no public support and thus ‘a person who exercises his or her right to apply for 
asylum, but who is destitute, will have no alternative but to turn to crime, or to begging, or to 
foraging’.99 Applying a similar logic in respect of access to education, the SCA held that ‘[t]he 
freedom to study is also inherent in human dignity for without it a person is deprived of the 
potential for human fulfilment.’100
Whereas Watchenuka ensured asylum-seekers’ qualified access to employment101 and 
education102 and as such was a key driver behind the RAA 2017 (see part III), the judgment 
failed to articulate rights-enhancing rationales derived from IRL obligations, relying instead 
on the rather vague and amorphous notions of (in)dignity and vulnerability. In turn, when 
the question of sector-specific restrictions on employment arose, the absence of IRL tenets in 
98 Ibid at para 25.
99 Ibid at para 32.
100 Ibid at para 36. See also Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v Essay NO & Others 
[2011] ZACC 13, 2011 (8) BCLR 761 at para 37(Holds that ‘the right to a basic education in section 29(1)(a) of 
the Constitution is immediately realisable’). See also Centre for Child Law v Minister of Basic Education [2019] 
ZAECGHC 126 (12 December 2019) where the Eastern Cape High Court affirmed the right to basic education 
of ‘undocumented’ children, some born of South African parents and others of foreign nationals, noting that 
denial of access to school has ‘devastating consequences’, which ‘denuded [children] of their self-esteem and 
self-worth, and the potential for human fulfilment’ and that ‘differentiating the children based on their 
documentation status impairs their fundamental right to dignity’ which amounted to unfair discrimination 
prohibited by the Constitution and by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Ibid at paras 81, 85–86.
101 Also see Lucien Ntumba Musanga & Others v Minister of Labour & Others (NGHC, case no. 29994/18, 
unreported judgment)(Challenged regs 1 & 2 to the Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001, which effectively 
prevented asylum-seekers from claiming Unemployment Insurance Fund benefits; the case was settled on the 
day of hearing, 27 February 2019, with a declaration that the impugned regulations were unconstitutional, 
requiring modification of the system to recognise applications submitted with asylum permit numbers).
102 S Carciotto, V Gastrow, C Johnson Manufacturing Illegality? The Impact of Curtailing Asylum Seekers’ Right to 
Work in South Africa (2017) 5(Notes that, following Watchenuka, SCRA has issued all asylum permits with the 
right to work and study).
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determining its constitutionality proved decisive. Union of Refugee Women103 appraised the 
exclusion of both asylum-seekers and recognised refugees from security service posts due to the 
imposition of a citizenship or permanent residence requirement.104 Rejecting the application, 
the Court held that the restriction had a rational purpose and that it was narrowly tailored by 
not applying to all industries, notwithstanding its recognition that ‘refugees’ are ‘unquestionably 
a vulnerable group in our society’.105 The majority dismissed the claim that permanent residents 
are the relevant comparator for the purposes of appraising ‘unfair discrimination’ as per s 9(3) 
of the Constitution.
Mokgoro and O’Regan JJ, dissenting, noted that rights which ‘arise from international law 
… need to be understood in the light of our international obligations’ and that ‘preference 
should be given to a meaning which is consistent with our international obligations’. They 
posited that ‘recognised refugees are most similarly situated to permanent residents’.106 Yet, by 
focusing on recognised refugees, even the dissent implicitly accepted that sectoral restrictions 
may be imposed on all asylum-seekers, irrespective of the length of their stay in SA and of 
delays in assessing their applications, thereby refraining from critical engagement with the 
contours of art 17 of the 1951 Convention and its applicability in SA.
The SCA was subsequently called upon to appraise whether restrictions on self-employment 
are compatible with art 18 of the 1951 Convention. Limpopo107 concerned the refusal of 
licences and closure of spaza shops, owned and operated by refugees and asylum-seekers in 
Limpopo Province. The SCA held that ‘if, because of circumstances, a refugee or asylum-
seeker is unable to obtain wage-earning employment and is on the brink of starvation, which 
brings with it humiliation and degradation, and that person can only sustain him- or herself 
by engaging in trade, … such a person ought to be able to rely on the constitutional right to 
dignity in order to advance a case for the granting of a licence to trade. This is so given that 
South Africa has no general social assistance programme for refugees, and none of the existing 
grants are available to asylum seekers.’108 Notably, in IRL, whereas host countries are expected 
to provide social assistance,109 employment rights are not derived from and are certainly not 
contingent on the absence of such assistance. Yet, while the SCA reprimanded ‘the attitude of 
the State in that regard’ as ‘worrying and unacceptable as it would amount to defeating South 
Africa’s international obligations arising under international refugee and human rights law’,110 
it did not articulate which obligations it was referring to, nor base its determination on their 
breach.
More recently, the SCA was handed a chance to utilise South Africa’s IHRL obligations in 
respect of the right to marry. Mzalisi NO111 concerned a Nigerian asylum-seeker wishing to 
103 Union of Refugee Women & Others v Director, Private Sector Industry Regulatory Authority & Others [2006] ZACC 
23, 2007 (4) SA 395 (CC).
104 Pursuant to s 23(1)(a) of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 (but subject to an exemption 
in s 23(6) which, per Union of Refugee Women ibid at para 48 ‘if properly applied will save it from the 
overbreadth criticism’.).
105 Union of Refugee Women (note 103 above) at para 28.
106 Ibid at paras 104, 106, 109.
107 Limpopo (note 40 above).
108 Ibid at para 43.
109 1951 Convention arts 20, 21, 23, and 24, referring to ‘rationing’, ‘housing’, public relief ’ and ‘labour legislation 
and social security’, respectively.
110 Limpopo (note 40 above) at para 44.
111  Mzalisi NO & Others v Ochogwu & Another [2019] ZASCA 138 (SCA).
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register their customary law marriage to a South African. An MHA circular proclaimed that 
persons ‘whose asylum seeker application status is pending cannot contemplate marriage’.112 
Given that neither the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 nor the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 have 
immigration-related eligibility requirements, the provision was declared invalid, upholding 
the lower court’s ruling. Yet, in so doing, the SCA judgment did not refer to art 23(2) of the 
ICCPR, which enunciates that ‘[t]he right of men and women of marriageable age to marry 
and to found a family shall be recognized’. Rather, the SCA turned to dignity, holding that 
‘[t]he right to family life is not a coincidental consequence of human dignity, but rather a core 
ingredient of it’, citing the Court’s Nandutu113 judgment, which affirmed the rights of foreign 
spouses and children to obtain a change in visa status from within SA.
3 Access to temporary and permanent residence permits
While an asylum application is pending, life happens. Asylum-seekers may marry (as above). 
They may wish to capitalise on the greater security of permanent residence. They may seek 
assurance of access to rights that are haphazardly denied to s 22 permit holders. Hence, they 
may want to apply for temporary or permanent residence permits.
The dual predicament that Ahmed addressed was this: the policy of preventing asylum-
seeker permit-holders from applying for temporary or permanent residence permits coupled 
with a requirement that such applications cannot be made in-country.114 Immigration Directive 
21 of 2015 issued on 3 February 2016 by the DHA Director-General stated that ‘[a] holder 
of an asylum seeker permit who has not been certified as a Refugee may not apply for a 
temporary residence visa or permanent residence permit.’115 Hence, for instance, an asylum-
seeker marrying a South African would be ineligible qua asylum-seeker to apply in-country 
for a spousal visa. The Directive effectively qualified s 31(2) of the IA, which allows the 
Minister of Home Affairs to, inter alia, ‘grant a foreigner the rights of permanent residence 
for a specified or an unspecified period when special circumstances exist which justify such a 
decision.’ Claimants argued that, due to the backlog in the asylum system, especially in respect 
of Refugee Appeal Board (RAB) appeals,116 asylum-seekers are stuck indefinitely in a precarious 
112 Circular s 2.1(b)(iii)(dd).
113 Nandutu & Others v Minister of Home Affairs & Others [2019] ZACC 24, 2019 (8) BCLR 938 (CC) at para 1.
114 Ahmed v Minister of Home Affairs [2018] ZACC 39, 2019 (1) SA 1 (CC).
115 Ibid at para 44 (‘an official policy document, which guides government departments on how to apply legislation’).
116 Report of the Auditor-General on a Follow-up Performance Audit of the Immigration Process for Illegal Immigrants 
at the Department of Home Affairs (February 2020) at para 2.4.(d), available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-
west-1.amazonaws.com/200204AGSA_report.pdf (Notes that the SCRA backlog is 40 326 cases and the RAB 
backlog is 147 794 cases, which would take 68 years to attend to without taking new cases). The basis for the 
latter calculation is the DHA Immigration Services’ Asylum Seeker Management, 2018 Annual Report, which 
indicated that, in 2018, the RAB issued 844 decisions, of which 600 were referred to the RSDO. According 
to the MHA’s Written Reply to Question no. 1767 (1 June 2018), there was only one RAB panel, consisting of 
three members. In turn, SCRA upheld 14 628 RSDO decisions in 2018; set aside 3 499; and referred 3 755. 
The DHA Report also noted that, in 2018, 18 354 arrivals had been registered as asylum-seekers, a drop from 
24 174 registered in 2017 and 35 377 recorded in 2016. The MHA’s Written Reply to Question no. 380 (26 July 
2019) noted that 516 asylum-seekers with s 22 permits were waiting for an interview with an RSDO for between 
30 and 90 days, whereas 2 503 were waiting for an interview for more than 90 days. The average waiting time 
was 30 days or less. The peak years for asylum applications were 2008 and 2009, when 207 206 and 223 324 
applications were received, respectively. Since then, application numbers have steadily lower (see MHA’s Written 
Reply to Question no. 1766 (1 June 2018)).
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status, unable to obtain the security that other permits could offer even when their personal 
circumstances have changed.
The Court accepted Ahmed’s appeal. It recognised that ‘requiring an asylum seeker to 
return to their countries [sic] of origin, in order to apply, would, in all likelihood, require that 
the asylum seeker give up their asylum seeker permit’.117 However, given that the applicants 
did not challenge reg 9 (requiring applications for temporary or permanent residence permits 
to be made out of SA), the Court stopped short of ‘unilaterally mak[ing] a provision which 
differentiates asylum seekers from other applicants under the Immigration Act, by directing 
that the Department receive these applications from asylum seekers from within the borders 
of the country’.
Regrettably, the Court also refrained from relying on IRL tenets to cement the normative 
basis underlying the claim: asylum-seekers are qualitatively different than other migrants in 
that, as presumptive refugees, they cannot return to their countries of origin to lodge a permit 
application or otherwise. Indeed, as part III illustrates below, under s 5(1)(d) of the RA (as 
amended by the RAA 2017), were refugees to ‘visit’ their country of origin for any purpose, 
their refugee status could be withdrawn! Denying them, as asylum-seeker permit holders, access 
to rights that are attached to other immigration statuses and denying them the opportunity to 
apply for such statuses without losing their protection cuts against the IRL logic.
The Ahmed judgment also noted that, ‘[t]he Refugees Act protects both [refugees and asylum 
seekers] but their rights vary significantly’.118 The latter indeed seems to be the Executive’s 
premise. Yet courts ought to question it: as noted above, the RA explicitly grants certain rights 
to ‘refugees’; but if refugee status is declaratory, why should rights of asylum-seekers ‘vary 
significantly’ from those of recognised refugees?
It is argued that, ultimately, even those judgments that have protected asylum-seekers’ access 
to rights — most notably Watchenuka, Ahmed, and Ruta — have refrained from articulating 
the normative significance of asylum-seekers as ‘presumptive refugees’ and the ensuing IRL 
obligations. As part III demonstrates, the RAA 2017 explicitly rejects this premise: a stark 
differentiation between asylum-seekers and recognised refugees lies at its core, reversing 
judicially mandated prescriptions from which asylum-seekers have benefited until now. The 
RAA 2017 also overtly diverges from the spirit and the letter of IRL instruments, yet it does 
not ‘own’ or justify the decision to do so. Indeed, perhaps inadvertently, by dovetailing the 
coming into force of RAA 2008, which was legislated in a more protective era, the RAA 2017’s 
commencement has simultaneously adversely affected protection and enhanced the legal tools 
for prospective constitutional challenges thereto (explored in part IV).
 Protracted asylum procedures may cause undue psychological distress and hinder asylum-seekers’ integration. 
L Schockaert, E Venables, MT Gil-Bazo, G Barnwell, R Gerstenhaberk & K Whitehouse ‘Behind the Scenes 
of South Africa’s Asylum Procedure: A Qualitative Study on Long-term Asylum-Seekers from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’ (2020) 39 Refugee Survey Quarterly 26.
117 Ahmed (note 114 above) at para 59.
118 Ibid at para 24.
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III  THE REFUGEES AMENDMENT ACT 2017 AND INTERNATIONAL 
REFUGEE LAW
A  The curious incident of the RAA 2017
On 12 December 2019, President Ramaphosa signed a proclamation stipulating that the 
RAA 2008 ‘shall come into force on 1 January 2020’.119 The much-delayed commencement 
of the RAA 2008120 triggered an immediate coming into force of the Refugees Amendment 
Act 12 of 2011 (RAA 2011) and of the RAA 2017.121 The new regulations, repealing the 2000 
regulations, were also gazetted and came into force on 1 January 2020.
The RAA 2008 enacts s 1A of the RA and repeals s 6. Section 1A replicates s 6 save for 
one substantive change: substituting the phrase ‘with due regard to’ with ‘in a manner that is 
consistent with.’ As amended, the RA has to be ‘interpreted and applied ‘in a manner that is 
consistent with’ the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and ‘any domestic law or other relevant convention 
or international agreement to which the Republic is or becomes a party’. It can be argued 
that ‘with due regard’ is rather ambiguous, which perhaps partly explains why SA courts have 
rarely referenced it (for discussion see part II). In contradistinction, ‘in a manner consistent 
with’ is unequivocal and considerably stronger: it requires an appraisal of compatibility with 
the enumerated instruments in any case within the ambit of the RA.
Part IV will consider the constitutional (review) ramifications of the combined coming into 
effect of the RAA 2008 and the RAA 2017.122 This part explores key legislative changes brought 
about by the RAA 2017 affecting the livelihood of asylum-seekers in five main areas: exclusion 
from refugee status; access to asylum; asylum processing centres (APCs) and restrictions on 
movement; access to employment and education; and restrictions of political activities. Each 
of those changes alone, and especially taken together, represent significant backtracking from 
the commitment to IRL in the (unmodified) Preamble to the RA. Several changes appear to 
be direct responses to adverse judgments, notably Watchenuka and Limpopo (regarding access 
to employment and education) and Saidi (regarding asylum permits/visas). Others (re)open 
protection gaps which courts, utilising the Bill of Rights, sought to close.
While this article focuses on the status and rights of asylum-seekers, it would be remiss 
not to briefly highlight the two main detrimental effects of the RAA 2017 on status and 
119 The Proclamation was published on 27 December 2019 in Government Gazette No. 42932.
120 The lapse of time between legislation and implementation renders the justifiability of such measures particularly 
suspect. This was not the first instance in which the implementation of an Act was delayed, absent proclamation: 
no Presidential proclamation has ever been made under s 1(1) of the Application of Resolutions of the Security 
Council of the United Nations Act 172 of 1993. The (ab)use of the power to make proclamations raises 
interesting constitutional questions: see eg Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security in re S v Walters [2002] ZACC 
6, 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) at paras 71–73(Holds that the President’s power to determine the date of coming into 
operation of an Act is a public power that must be exercised lawfully: it cannot be used to veto or otherwise block 
implementation).
121 RAA 2017 s 33 stipulates that it comes into operation immediately after the commencement of the RAA 2008 
and the RAA 2011; RAA 2011 s 14 stipulates that it comes into operation immediately after the commencement 
of the RAA 2008; RAA 2008 s 34 states that it ‘comes into operation on a date determined by the President by 
proclamation in the Gazette’.
122 RAA 2011 enacts relatively minor changes which do not fundamentally challenge IRL. For completeness, 
the Refugees Amendment Act 10 of 2015 came into operation on 27 September 2015, allowing the media and 
the public access to RAB hearings.
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rights of recognised refugees in SA and their incompatibility with the 1951 Convention. First, 
the legislation institutes new grounds for cessation of status (referred to as ‘withdrawal’), 
intensifying refugee precariousness. Second, it renders permanent residence and, consequently, 
naturalisation, far less attainable.
Under the 1951 Convention framework, once refugee status is granted, cessation can 
only take place in one or more of the circumstances enumerated in the six sub-clauses of 
art 1C which ‘are negative in character and are exhaustively enumerated’.123 Now, the OAU 
Convention’s additional cessation clause (that a refugee ‘has seriously infringed the purposes 
and objectives of this Convention’) arguably raises an interpretive tension which is yet to 
be judicially resolved: with respect to the refugee definition, where the later, region-specific 
treaty is more protective, and hence should be followed by SA as party to both, under the 
OAU’s cessation clause circumstances may arise which mandate cessation of protection but 
not under the 1951 Convention.124 This longstanding challenge notwithstanding, the RAA 
2017 introduces new cessation clauses that are not articulated in either treaty, and revises 
enumerated cessation grounds in a manner that diverges from their meaning. It therefore 
entails withdrawal of refugee protection from persons who should continue to enjoy it under 
both the 1951 Convention and the OAU Convention.125 Four RAA 2017 stipulations are 
particularly concerning.
First, the Minister of Home Affairs is authorised to ‘cease the recognition of the refugee status 
of any individual refugee or category of refugees, or to revoke such status’.126 Whereas s 5(1)(e) 
of the RA has already provided for cessation of status where a change of circumstances related 
to the grounds for recognition had occurred (as per arts 1C(5–6) of the 1951 Convention), 
the new cessation ground provides no guidance as to the additional basis for a decision to cease 
status of individuals or indeed en masse.
Second, the RAA authorises cessation of status if a refugee merely ‘returns to visit’ that 
country.127 Section 5(1)(d) of the RA pre-RAA 2017 followed the 1951 Convention art 1C(4) 
stipulation that a refugee must have ‘voluntarily re-established’ themselves in the country which 
they left to meet that cessation ground. UHNCR’s longstanding position is that ‘refugees 
123 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures (note 39 above) para 116. See also S Kneebone & Maria O’Sullivan ‘Article 
1C’ in A Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A 
Commentary (OUP 2011) 480, 483; G Cole ‘Cessation Clauses’ in Oxford Handbook of International Refugee 
Law (note 27 above).
124 Compare International Law Commission (ILC), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group, UN doc A/
CN.4/L.702 (18 July 2006) (the question here is one of conflict between norms governing the same area of 
treaty law).
125 There is also no apparent regional practice that potentially alters the scope of IRL in the African region. For 
discussion see DJ Cantor & F Chikwanha ‘Reconsidering African Refugee Law’ (2019) 31(2–3) International 
Journal of Refugee Law 182. Cantor & Chikwanha also call for a ‘broader consideration of whether national 
refugee laws provide evidence of wider processes of custom formation in relation to other rules, particularly those 
that fall outside the terms of existing refugee treaties’. ‘Reconsidering African Refugee Law’ fn 378 page 245
126 RA (as amended) s 5(1)(h).
127 RA (as amended) s 5(1)(d). For example, see R Ziegler Voting Rights of Refugees (2017) ch 6 (re challenges arising 
in respect of refugee Out-of-Country Voting, including risk of premature cessation, as per arts 1C(1), (5) of the 
1951 Convention).
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should be able to make visits ‘to their country of origin to inform themselves of the situation 
there — without such visits automatically involving loss of refugee status’.128
Third, the new regulations consider engagement with the country of origin’s consular 
authorities without prior permission of the Minister as a basis for withdrawal of refugee 
status — an unduly expansive interpretation of the art 1C(1) ‘re-availment’ of ‘protection’ 
clause. Moreover, this is a rather remarkable stipulation given that SA authorities often require 
refugees to provide birth or marriage certificates, which can only be issued to refugees by their 
country of nationality.129 Elsewhere,130 I cautioned against host countries’ reliance on contacts 
with country of origin officials to consider refugees as having ‘re-availed’ themselves of the 
‘protection’ of their country, even though many refugees may fear the actions of non-state 
actors in their country of origin rather than state officials. Nevertheless, an explicit blanket 
legislative stipulation to that effect is a radical departure from global practice.
Fourth, and somewhat relatedly, the new regulations pronounce that any person who ‘stands 
for political office or votes in any election … of … country of nationality without the approval 
of the Minister’131 or ‘participates in any political campaign or activity related to … country 
of origin or nationality whilst in the Republic without the permission of the Minister’132 will 
have their refugee status withdrawn. Elsewhere,133 I warned against the possibility that host 
countries would consider participation in country of origin elections as ground for cessation, 
especially when done in-country but even when refugees vote remotely. The new stipulation 
goes much further, with the pre-authorisation requirement likely to have a chilling effect on 
refugees seeking to protest abuses in their country of origin including those which may have 
caused their flight.134
By design, the RAA 2017 severs any ties that may remain between refugees and the 
political communities of their country of origin. It is therefore particularly unwelcome 
that it concomitantly doubles, from five to ten years, the residence requirement that must 
be satisfied before a recognised refugee can apply to have their status certified, a precursor 
to grant of permanent residence, which in turn is a precursor to naturalisation.135 This 
retrogressive approach is at odds with IRL: while art 34 of the 1951 Convention does not 
require naturalisation of refugees, asylum countries undertake to ‘as far as possible… facilitate 
the[ir] assimilation and naturalization’ and, at the very least, should certainly not be rendering 
naturalisation for refugees harder than for other migrants.136
128 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No. 18 (Voluntary Repatriation) (16 October 1980) para (e), available at https://
www.unhcr.org/uk/excom/exconc/3ae68c6e8/voluntary-repatriation.html.
129 Regulations 4(1)(a–d) of the new Regulations.
130 Ziegler Voting Rights of Refugees (note 127 above) ch 7.
131 Regulation 4(1)(g) of the new Regulations.
132 Regulation 4(1)(i)) of the new Regulations.
133 Ziegler Voting Rights of Refugees (note 127 above) ch 6.
134 For discussion of permissible modes of political participation pre RAA 2017, see M Mpeiwa ‘The Case of 
Congolese Refugees in South Africa’ in L Antara (ed) Political Participation of Refugees (2018).
135 Section 27(3) of the RA (as amended). Further to doubling the post-recognition residence period, the amended 
provision also mandates SCRA to consider ‘all the relevant factors and within a reasonable period of time, 
including efforts made to secure peace and stability in the refugee’s country of origin’ before it ‘certifies’ that 
the applicant ‘would remain a refugee indefinitely’.
136 For discussion see F Khan and R Ziegler ‘Refugee Naturalization and Integration: Where “Durable Solutions” 
meet Socio-Political Realities’ in Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law (note 27 above).
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In addition to the new restrictions on recognised refugees, part F appraises new prohibitions 
on political activities of asylum-seekers within South Africa. Consequently, recognised refugees 
are now restricted in their political engagement vis-à-vis their country of origin, on pain of 
cessation/withdrawal of status; prohibited from taking part in political activities related to 
SA; and have vanishingly small prospects of naturalising and consequently enjoying full 
membership of SA’s political community, including electoral participation.
In Voting Rights of Refugees,137 I argue that recognised refugees are a special category 
of non-citizen residents in need of (full) membership in a political community for an 
indeterminate, ex ante unknown, period of time; and that it is therefore desirable, de lege 
ferenda, that they be treated by their countries of asylum as if they were their citizens in respect 
of entitlements which, in international law, may be subject to a citizenship qualification — 
including electoral rights. Post- RAA 2017, South Africa offers an illustration of the political 
limbo in which refugees may find themselves in their countries of asylum. In Arendt’s terms, 
recognised refugees in SA are now deprived of ‘a place in the world which makes opinions 
significant and actions effective’.138
B  Exclusion from refugee status
Article 1F of the 1951 Convention defines three categories of persons to whom the 1951 
Convention shall not apply due to the deplorable nature of acts that they have committed prior 
to admission to a country of asylum. Such exclusions pertain to underserving persons. In turn, 
Article 1E denies the application of 1951 Convention protections to a person ‘recognized by 
the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights 
and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country’. Article 
1E exclusions thus apply to those deemed to enjoy elsewhere status superior to that of refugees.
RAA 2017 amends s 4(1)(d) of the RA to exclude any person who ‘enjoys the protection 
of any other country in which he or she is a recognised refugee, resident or citizen’ (emphasis 
added), adding ‘resident’ to the original RA articulation. The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures 
posits that ‘the [art 1E] exclusion operates if a person’s status is largely assimilated to that of 
a national of the country. In particular he must, like a national, be fully protected against 
deportation or expulsion.’139 Yet residence (unlike permanent residence) does not generally 
offer such protection. In amending s 4(1)(d), the RAA 2017 is effectively following the White 
Paper in adopting a ‘safe first country of entry’ approach140 which substantively diverges 
from the emphasis put in Article 1E of the 1951 Convention on security of residence in a 
non-persecutory country as per its nationals being sine qua non for its application.141
137 Ziegler Voting Rights of Refugees (note 127 above) ch 8.
138 H Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism (1950) 296.
139 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures (note 39 above) at para 145.
140 DHA White Paper on Home Affairs (August 2019) (noting that ‘asylum seekers should seek refuge in the first 
safe country they enter’), available at http://www.dha.gov.za/images/PDFs/UPDATEDdhawhitepaper2019.pdf. 
Compare re transfer agreements: S Bar-Tuvia ‘Australian and Israeli Agreements for the Permanent Transfer of 
Refugees: Stretching Further the (Il)legality and (Im)morality of Western Externalisation Policies’ (2018) 30(3) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 477.
141 Article 1E of the 1951 Convention excludes a person ‘recognized by the competent authorities of the country 
in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the 
nationality of that country.’
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Within the 1951 Convention framework, the three art 1F exclusion clauses constitute an 
exhaustive list and, given their effect, must ‘always be interpreted in a restrictive manner’.142 In 
Africa, the OAU Convention’s additional exclusion clause, that a person ‘has been guilty of acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the Organization of African Unity’, 143 raises similar 
interpretive questions to those discussed above regarding the additional clause concerning 
cessation of status. Sections 4(1)(a) (b), and (c) of the (pre-RAA 2017) RA include ‘exclusion’ 
clauses which broadly reproduce arts 1F(a), (b), and (c) of the 1951 Convention, the latter 
relating to acts against the ‘objects’ (akin to purposes) and ‘principles’ of both the UN Charter 
and the OAU Convention. Yet, similarly to its approach to cessation, the RAA 2017 introduces 
five new exclusion clauses which are not recognised by either the 1951 Convention or the OAU 
Convention. The effect of each of the five new clauses is to deny refugee status to persons 
who are ‘refugees’ within the meaning of art 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and the OAU 
Convention. Taken together, they have profound effects on the scope of refugee protection 
in SA.144
Given that unamended s 2 of the RA still protects excluded individuals from being deported 
or expelled to a country where they would be exposed to the risks stipulated in s 3, such persons 
could be left in indefinite legal limbo: no permit/visa either under the RA or the IA could be 
issued to regularise their sojourn in SA, so they would be protected from refoulement whilst left 
undocumented and subject to harassment, arrest, or indeterminate detention.
The new exclusion clauses are appraised below.
1 New section 4(1)(e): ‘has committed a crime in the Republic which is listed in Schedule 
2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act No. 105 of 1997), or which is 
punishable by imprisonment without the option of a fine’
Gavric concerned the application of pre RAA 2017 s 4(1)(b) of the RA, pertaining to exclusion 
of persons who committed a crime ‘which is not of a political nature’.145 The provision 
resembled art 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention, the application of which is explicitly limited 
to ‘serious non-political’ crimes committed outside the country of refuge prior to admission 
to that country as a refugee. In contrast, individuals who commit a crime in the country of 
refuge should be subject to that country’s criminal law process.146 This, as the SCA noted in 
142 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No. 5: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees HCP/GIP/03/05 (4 September 2003) at paras 2–3.
143 The OAU’S ‘purposes’ and ‘principles’ are outlined in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 25 May 
1963, 479 United Nations Treaty Series 39, arts II & III. They bear considerable overlap with the purposes and 
principles of the UN in arts II & III of its Charter — which form the third ground for exclusion from status 
under Art 1F of the 1951 Convention.
144 Cantor & Chikwanha (note 125 above) fn 252 (Notes that, other than SA, only seven countries out of 46 African 
countries surveyed have added exclusion clauses to the enumerated list in the OAU Convention. Other than SA, 
only Tanzania and Zimbabwe exclude persons granted refugee status by another country — both exempting 
persons who arrive via a territory ‘where there has been a serious breach of peace’. Ibid fn 260).
145 Gavric v Refugee Status Determination Officer [2018] ZACC 38, 2019 (1) SA 21 (CC) at para 50(Considers 
an exclusion decision to be a substantive decision like a decision by an RSDO to reject an application which 
triggers review by SCRA, for manifestly unfounded, fraudulent and abusive applications, or an appeal to RAB 
for unfounded applications).
146 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection (note 142 above) at paras 5, 16.
RUVI ZIEGLER
92 Constitutional Court Review 2020
Ruta, is due to the exceptional nature of the exclusion provisions and the severe consequences 
of exclusion for an individual.147
The RAA 2017 amends s 4(1)(b) of the RA to add the words ‘outside the Republic’, 
clarifying that provision’s application to the circumstances anticipated in art 1F(b). But it 
also adds a new provision, subsection (e), excluding from status any person who committed 
a crime in the Republic, which is listed in Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
105 of 1997), or which is punishable by imprisonment without the option of a fine. The 
modification of s 4(1)(b) magnifies the breach of IRL that is manifested by subsection (e): the 
1951 Convention requires host countries to deal with criminal activities committed within 
their territories through their criminal law, rather than through exclusion from status. This 
is illustrated by the fact that host countries are permitted — under stringent conditions and 
subject to nonrefoulement — to expel refugees on grounds of ‘national security or public order’ 
(art 32 of the 1951 Convention). Adding insult to injury, it is not clear that Schedule 2 offences 
meet the ‘serious non-political crime’ test that would have to apply to offences committed 
outside SA. Indeed, it is even questionable whether the pre-amendment criterion (‘offence 
punishable by imprisonment without the option of a fine’) satisfies this standard.
In addition to the new exclusion ground, a similar provision was introduced as a new 
cessation ground, raising similar concerns.148
2 New section 4(1)(f ): has committed an offence in relation to the fraudulent possession, 
acquisition or presentation of a South African identity card, passport, travel document, 
temporary residence visa or permanent residence permit
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention, entitled ‘refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge’, 
recognises that, asylum-seekers are often forced to arrive at or enter a territory without 
prior authorisation. They may differ fundamentally from other migrants in that they may 
not be able to comply with the legal formalities for entry. For instance, they may not be 
able to obtain the necessary documentation in advance of their flight because of their fear 
of persecution and/or the urgency of their departure. The Court in Saidi noted that ‘[s]
uch is their [refugees’] desperation that they almost all enter the country where they seek 
refuge illegally and without any official documents’149 Signatories to the 1951 Convention 
therefore undertake in subsection (1) not to impose penalties for their ‘illegal entry or 
presence’ on ‘refugees’ who are ‘coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom 
was threatened’ provided they ‘present themselves without delay to the authorities’ and ‘show 
good cause for their illegal entry or presence’.150
147 Ruta SCA (note 36 above) at para 65.
148 RA (as amended) s 5(1)(f).
149 Saidi (note 79 above) at para 71. Notably, under art 27 of the 1951 Convention, SA is required to issue identity 
papers to ‘any refugee in their territory who does not possess a valid travel document’.
150 The prevailing interpretation of art 31(1) is that its protections apply to persons who have briefly transited 
through other countries or who are unable to find effective protection in the first country or countries to which 
they flee; and that the requirement to present oneself ‘without delay’ must not be interpreted as a strict temporal 
requirement but rather depend on the refugee’s understanding of which authority they should report to and the 
availability of that authority. As for ‘good cause’, having a well-founded fear of persecution is in itself good cause 
for illegal entry. For broader discussion see e.g. G Noll ‘Article 31’ in A Zimmerman (note 123 above) ch 50; 
C Costello, Y Ioffe & T Büchsel Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (2017).
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Exclusion from refugee status, as per new subsection (f), due to fraudulent ‘possession, 
acquisition or presentation’ of an official document — assuming such document was used to 
secure entry into SA in order to seek asylum — constitutes wholesale denial of refugee protection 
to those who meet the 1951 Convention definition for actions they have undertaken for which 
they should not be penalised. The non-penalisation rationale stems from the declaratory nature 
of refugee status: lacking safe and legal routes to asylum in a host country, 1951 Convention 
refugees should not be penalised merely for seeking to obtain it by irregular means.
Again, a similar provision was introduced as a new cessation ground, raising similar 
challenges.151
3 New section 4(1)(g): fugitives from justice in another country where the ‘rule of law is 
upheld by a recognisable judiciary’
New exclusion subsection (g) raises both conceptual and practical challenges. The 1951 
Convention ‘refugee’ definition, which the RA incorporated, refers to a person who has a 
well-founded fear of persecution for one or more of the five 1951 Convention reasons, including 
‘membership of a particular social group’. There are many refugee-producing countries where 
a ‘recognisable judiciary’ (undefined term) is applying laws in other countries that are, for 
instance, persecutory towards LGBT+ persons.152 Article 1(xxi) of the RA defines ‘social 
group’ to include ‘among others, a group of persons of particular gender, sexual orientation, 
disability, class or caste’. The new provision could force the designation by South Africa of all 
countries where LGBT+ persons are persecuted as either not having a ‘recognisable judiciary’ 
or as countries where ‘the rule of law is [not] upheld’. Otherwise, it would undermine the 
fundamental premise of the RA by excluding persons fleeing such countries who are clearly in 
need of protection.
4 New section 4(1)(h): having entered the Republic other than through a designated Ports 
Of Entry fails to satisfy an RSDO that there are compelling reasons for doing so
In addition to applying to those arriving or securing entry through the use of false or falsified 
documents, the non-penalisation requirement in art 31 of the 1951 Convention also applies 
to those entering the country clandestinely.153 As per Asfaw, the purpose is ‘to protect refugees 
from the imposition of criminal penalties for breaches of the law reasonably or necessarily 
committed in the course of flight from persecution or threatened persecution’.154 Now, 
exclusion under the new provision can supposedly be avoided, provided that ‘compelling 
reasons’ are offered; yet such reasons are neither listed in the RAA 2017 nor in the new 
Regulations, leaving it to the RSDO’s discretion.155 The principled objection to exclusion as 
151 RA (as amended) s 5(1)(g).
152 Re criminalisation, see https://www.humandignitytrust.org/lgbt-the-law/map-of-criminalisation/.
153 GS Goodwin-Gill ‘Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Non-Penalization, 
Detention, and Protection’ in E Feller, V Türk, F Nicholson (eds) Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s 
Global Consultations on International Protection (2003) 186, 196; see also Ex parte Adimi (note 46 above).
154 R v Asfaw (UNHCR Intervening) [2008] 1 AC 1061 (Bingham LJ) at para 9.
155 Irrespective of other grounds for constitutional review discussed in part IV, this broad and undefined discretion 
would likely be found to be unconstitutional, based on the Dawood ratio. See Lawyers for Human Rights v 
Ministry of Home Affairs and Others [2017] ZACC 22, 2017 (5) SA 480 (CC) at paras 49–50.
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a form of penalisation for breach of immigration law, articulated in the above discussion of 
s 4(f), applies here too.
Asylum-seekers arriving at a PoE, declaring their intent to apply for asylum, should receive 
an Asylum Transit Visa (ATV), issued pursuant to s 23 of the IA, for a period of five days (as 
per the 2011 IAA, which reduced its length from the previous 14 days). For persons entering 
not through a PoE and hence lacking an ATV, or who have not been issued an ATV, the 
new regulations effectively deny any opportunity to apply for asylum unless they are either 
permanent residents or citizens of a neighbouring country and can show ‘good cause’ for their 
‘illegal entry’.156 The new regulations appear to conflate penalisation for illegal entry of persons 
who fail to meet the 1951 Convention art 31 tests, which is permissible, with their exclusion 
from protection, which is not.
5 New section 4(1)(i): has failed to report to the RRO within five days of entry into the 
Republic … in the absence of compelling reasons which may include hospitalisation, 
institutionalisation, on any other compelling reason provided that this provision shall 
not apply to a person who, while being in the Republic on a valid visa, other than a visa 
issued in terms of section 23 of the Immigration Act, applies for asylum
The ATV regime, described above, raises serious procedural concerns. Asylum-seekers must 
travel considerable distances to reach an RRO. When RROs devote only one day per week to 
applications of certain nationalities, the temporal limitation makes it more likely that irregular 
entry and non-reporting would render them undocumented.157 The new subsection (i) entails 
that, by missing an extremely narrow application window, presumptive refugees who have 
received an ATV upon entry will be excluded from status.
The new regulations refer to a ‘valid’ ATV as a pre-condition for an asylum application, 
unless a person is a ‘permanent resident or a citizen of a neighbouring country’: the reference 
to ‘compelling reasons’ in subsection (i) is not repeated in the new regulations. Recognising the 
category of refugees sur place, that is persons who have entered SA on a different visa and whose 
protection needs have arisen since, the new regulations nevertheless do not stipulate how such 
applications can be submitted — a challenge, given that an application must include a ‘proof 
of declaration of the intention to apply for asylum in the form of’ an ATV.158
C  Access to asylum and abandonment of applications
Section 22(1) of the RA (as amended) stipulates that ‘an asylum seeker whose application in 
terms of s 21(1) has not been adjudicated, is entitled to be issued with an asylum seeker visa, 
in the prescribed form, allowing the applicant to sojourn in the Republic temporarily, subject to 
such conditions as may be imposed, which are not in conflict with the Constitution or international 
law’ (emphasis added). The rhetorical commitment to avoid conflict with the Constitution 
or with ‘international law’ hits the provision’s substantive brick wall for two reasons. The first 
is the retrogressive denial of asylum-seekers’ access to employment and education (paragraph 
IIIE below). The second is the authorised withdrawal of visas in circumstances which Saidi 
156 Reg 8(1)(c)(i) of the new Regulations.
157 F Khan & M Lee ‘Policy Shifts in the Asylum Process in South Africa Resulting in Hidden Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers’ (August 2018) 4(2) African Human Mobility Review 1205.
158 Regulation 8(1)(c)(i) of the new Regulations.
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held to be unconstitutional: s 22(5) authorises the Director-General ‘at any time prior to the 
expiry of an asylum seeker visa’ to ‘withdraw such visa … if (b) ‘the application for asylum 
has been found to be manifestly unfounded, abusive or fraudulent’ (c) ‘the application for 
asylum has been rejected’.159 In turn, the Director-General can, ‘subject to section 29, cause the 
holder [of a withdrawn asylum seeker visa] to be arrested and detained pending the finalisation 
of the application for asylum, in the manner and place determined by him or her with due 
regard to human dignity’.160 Taken together, an asylum-seeker visa may be withdrawn despite 
an application for asylum awaiting final determination by the SCRA, the RAB, or pending 
judicial review.161
The RAA 2017 introduces the notion that an asylum application becomes abandoned 
one month after the expiry of an applicant’s visa,162 unless the applicant proves to SCRA 
that he or she was either institutionalised, entered into a Witness Protection Programme, 
was quarantined, or was arrested without bail.163 At the time of writing, the new provision 
will adversely impact persons particularly in the Western Cape due to the failure to properly 
implement the Scalabrini (II) court order (reopening the CTRRO) and the Nbaya court order 
(renewing permits originally issued in another RRO).164
In turn, any asylum-seeker who is found to have abandoned his/her application will not be 
allowed to reapply and will be dealt with by an immigration officer in terms of the provisions 
of the IA.165 Given that the provision clearly applies to those whose applications are pending,166 
the consequences are dire: should an asylum-seeker fail for any other reason to travel to a 
far-away RRO at regular intervals to renew their visa, they will be classified as an ‘illegal 
foreigner’ under the IA, and face risk of refoulement (only to be trumped by s 2 of the RA). 
Back to square one, then.
159 Other grounds for withdrawal: (a) the applicant contravenes any condition endorsed on that visa; (d) the 
applicant is or becomes ineligible for asylum in terms of s 4 (exclusion) or s 5 (cessation).
160 RA (as amended) s 23.
161 See Reply to Question NW1292 to the Minister of Home Affairs (22 November 2019), available at https://pmg.
org.za/committee-question/12750/(Notes that, in 2018, 3706 High Court review applications were registered; 
the equivalent 2017 figure is 2493). See also Reply to Question NW1970 to the Minister of Home Affairs (27 
June 2018), available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-question/9306/(Notes that, in the years 2013–2018, there 
were 5 288 judicial reviews).
162 RA (as amended) s 22(12). As per s 22(13), an applicant whose application was abandoned cannot re-apply and 
must be dealt with as an illegal foreigner in terms of s 32 of the IA
163 The permissible conditions are stipulated in reg 11(10) of the new Regulations, yet it is not clear how an asylum-
seeker is to present their case before SCRA.
164 Scalabrini v Minister of Home Affairs (submitted 24 March 2020) (WCHC) (papers with author) (challenging 
ss 22(12), (13) and reg 9 of the new Regulations).
165 RA (as amended) s 22(1); reg 9(3) of the new Regulations.
166 Additionally, asylum appeals must be lodges within ten working days, absent institutionalisation, entry into a 
witness protection programme, quarantine or arrest without bail. Regulation 14(1) of the new Regulations.
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D  Asylum processing centres and restrictions on movement
The pre-RAA 2017 RA opted for a non-encampment policy,167 paving the way for local 
integration of asylum-seekers and refugees.168 The RAA 2017 arguably reverses this policy 
objective in respect of asylum-seekers by authorising the DHA Director-General to ‘require any 
category of asylum seeker to report to any particular or designated RRO, or other place specially 
designated as such, when lodging an application for asylum’ (emphasis added).169 It further 
stipulates that such designation may be made for specific countries of origin, geographical area, 
gender, nationality, political opinion, or social group.170 Article 3 of the 1951 Convention 
stipulates that the treaty shall apply to refugees ‘without discrimination as to race, religion, or 
country of origin’: discrimination between asylum-seekers based on county of origin would 
arguably prima facie breach IRL.
The Minister of Home Affairs (MHA) 2017 White Paper revealed that SA is planning to 
build APCs near its borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique ‘that will be used to profile 
and accommodate asylum seekers during their status determination process’.171 It anticipates 
that governmental departments and international organisations (including UNHCR and the 
ICRC) will operate there. The Paper proposes that ‘low risk’ (a term that it does not define) 
asylum-seekers may have the right to enter or leave the facility and be released into the care of 
national or international organisations and family or community members, who would have 
to provide assurances that basic services will be provided for.172
The new regulations do not specify a time limit for enforced presence at the APCs. 
Meanwhile, they remove the time limits set in s 3(1) of the 2000 Regulations, which stipulated 
that an asylum claim will generally be ‘adjudicated’ within 180 days and that the first interview 
will take place within 30 days; and which set in place procedures to follow when applications 
remain in process after 180 days. Concomitantly, asylum-seekers will be deprived of the 
Watchenuka and Limpopo court-mandated access to employment and education, respectively 
(see part IIIE below) ‘since their basic needs will be catered for in the processing centres’. APCs 
may not be called detention centres, but their proposed modus operandi conforms.173 Indeed, as 
UNHCR argues, the key questions are whether an asylum-seeker is de facto deprived of their 
167 J Crush, C Skinner, M Stugaitis ‘Benign Neglect or Active Destruction? A Critical Analysis of Refugee and 
Informal Sector Policy and practice in South Africa’ (2017) 3(2) African Human Mobility Review 751, 753. Note 
RA s 35 (reception and accommodation of asylum seekers in event of mass influx) which permits the MHA (2) 
‘after consultation with the UNHCR representative and the Premier of the province concerned [to] designate 
areas, centres or places for the temporary reception and accommodation of asylum-seekers or refugees…’ This 
subsection was never activated. Regarding practices elsewhere in Africa cf Maple (note 72 above) App 1: Table 
5 (‘Countries with Long Term Encampment Policies and FOM Restrictions in National Legislation’).
168 Hence, courts have not had to reconcile s 21(1) of the Bill of Rights, proclaiming that ‘everyone has the right to 
freedom of movement’ with s 21(3) thereof, which guarantees ‘every citizen...the right to enter, to remain in and 
to reside anywhere in the Republic’ (emphases added).
169 RA (as amended) s 21(c).
170 RA s 21(d).
171 White Paper on International Migration (note 13 above) 61.
172 Ibid.
173 Compare R Ziegler ‘No Asylum for “Infiltrators”: The Legal Predicament of Eritrean and Sudanese Nationals in 
Israel’ (2015) 29(2) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 172 (Appraises an Israeli High Court 
of Justice judgment quashing legislation that mandated the holding of persons in ‘residence centres’).
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liberty (regardless of labels) and whether such deprivation is lawful according to international 
law.174
Asylum-seekers enjoy protection with respect to detention under both IRL and IHRL.175 
The ICCPR stipulates that ‘everyone has the right to liberty and security of person’, and that ‘no 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention’. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
opined that restrictions pursuant to art 9 can be direct or indirect: for instance, providing 
a person with the necessities of life in only a specified location amounts to a restriction on 
freedom of movement and choice of residence.176 It accepted that ‘an asylum seeker may be 
detained for a brief initial period in order to document their entry, record their claims and 
determine their identity if it is in doubt. To detain them further while their claims are being 
resolved would be arbitrary in the absence of reasons specific to the individual, such as an 
individualized likelihood of absconding, a danger of crimes against others, or a risk of acts 
against national security.’177 The HRC further noted that detention ‘must … not be based 
on a mandatory rule for a broad category, must take into account less invasive means of 
achieving the same ends, such as reporting obligations, sureties or other conditions to prevent 
absconding, and must be subject to periodic re-evaluation and judicial review’.178 Hence, in 
order for restrictions of liberty of asylum-seekers to be lawful under the ICCPR, they must 
include substantive and procedural safeguards; the RAA 2017 clearly lacks both.179
In turn, the IRL treaty basis for restrictions on movement of asylum-seekers rests in art 31(2) 
of the 1951 Convention, which enjoins host countries from ‘apply[ing] to the movements of 
such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only 
be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another 
country’. The ‘necessity’ test under art 31(2) is coterminous with the prohibition on ‘arbitrary’ 
detention in art 9 of the ICCPR, above. As for ‘regularization’, the better view is that its 
meaning is confined to lifting the unlawfulness of the illegal entry or presence of the refugee 
concerned, exchanging the unauthorised presence for an authorised one (in SA, arguably that 
translates to the issuance of a s 22 visa to an asylum-seeker), rather than a completed refugee 
174 UNHCR Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers 
and Alternatives to Detention (2012), available at https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/505b10ee9/
unhcr-detention-guidelines.html. Compare HCJ 8425/13 Eitan et al v Israeli government et al (22 September 
2014) (Israeli Supreme Court)(Holds that the Holot ‘residence centre’ was a de facto detention centre and hence 
that the 2013 Law for the Prevention of Infiltration (Amendment no. 4) violated the constitutional rights to 
liberty and human dignity. For analysis see RR Ziegler ‘No Asylum for “Infiltrators”: The Legal Predicament of 
Eritrean and Sudanese Nationals in Israel’ (2015) 29(2) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 172.
175 For discussion see M Zieck ‘Refugees and the Right to Freedom of Movement: From Flight to Return’ (2018) 
39(1) Michigan Journal of International Law 196 (comparing art 9(1) of the ICCPR with art 31(2) of the 1951 
Convention).
176 HRC General Comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person) (16 December 2014) at para 20.
177 Ibid at para 18.
178 Ibid.
179 Compare UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention report regarding ‘transit zones’ set by Hungary on 
the Hungarian-Serbian border, noting that ‘there can be no doubt that holding migrants in these “transit 
zones” constitutes deprivation of liberty in accordance with international law’ (15 November 2018), available at 
https://bit.ly/2B7X5Pu; but see the European Court of Human Rights’ Grand Chamber judgment in App No. 
47287/15 Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary (21 November 2019), holding by a majority (Bianku, Vucinic JJ dissenting) 
that despite ‘significant restriction on their freedom of movement, [the restrictions] did not limit their liberty 
unnecessarily or to an extent or in a manner unconnected to the examination of their asylum claim’, in part due 
to the fact that, as stated at para 242, ‘the applicants spent only twenty-three days in the zone’.
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status determination procedure.180 Once regularisation occurs, asylum-seekers should enjoy 
the protection of art 26 of the 1951 Convention, which requires a country of asylum to 
‘accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence to move 
freely within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances.’181
In October 2018, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
expressed concerns about ‘the proposal of establishment of asylum processing centres in border 
areas’ as well as ‘the reportedly large backlog of asylum applications pending in the appeal 
process’182 and urged South Africa to ‘[e]xpeditiously clear the backlog of asylum applications 
pending in the appeal process’.183 At the time of writing, no APC has been built, while the 
backlog remains.
E  Access to employment and education
Part II demonstrated how courts have steadily chipped away at government policies attempting 
to restrict access of asylum-seekers to wage-earning employment, self-employment, and 
education, as well as sought to restrict their movement. The Green Paper on Immigration, 
which preceded the RAA 2017, posited that ‘the adoption of a policy of non-encampment that, 
coupled with non-provision of basic food and accommodation to “indigent asylum-seekers”’ 
has led courts to ‘oblig[ing] the Department of Home Affairs to consider issuing deserving 
cases with permits allowing them to work or study’ which ‘has become a powerful “pull factor” 
which further burdens the asylum system leading to many adjudication cases being delayed for 
years’.184 The government’s assessment therefore recognises that, judicially sanctioned access 
to employment came about first and foremost because asylum-seekers do not receive social 
assistance while their applications are appraised. The RAA 2017 ‘responds’ to the challenge 
both by paving the way for confining asylum-seekers to APCs (as per above) and by reversing 
the post Watchenuka and Limpopo default regarding asylum-seekers’ access to wage-earning 
employment, self-employment, and education.185
Under the RAA 2017, asylum-seekers wishing to have their right to work ‘endorsed’ on their 
visa186 must satisfy an RSDO that they are unable to sustain themselves and their dependants.187 
They ‘may be assessed’ (pursuant to undefined parameters) to determine their eligibility.188 
Should they be successful in demonstrating that they cannot self-sustain, ‘they may be offered 
180 HRC General Comment (note 176 above) at para 18.
181 In Scalabrini (II) (note 69 above), the SCA regarded restrictions on access to RROs (caused by the closure of 
the Cape Town RRO) as having an adverse effect on the right of ‘refugees lawfully in its territory’ to ‘choose 
their place of residence and move freely within the asylum country’s territory’ (but has not pronounced on IRL 
ramifications).
182 ICESCR Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of South Africa (12 October 2018) at para 25.
183 Ibid at para 26(a).
184 Green Paper (note 12 above) at para 12.
185 Reacting to the Green Paper, UNHCR noted that ‘the right to work is a fundamental human right, integral to 
human dignity and self-respect, and that reliance on assistance is not conducive to self-sufficiency’. B Jordan 
‘Not in our name, UN body tells SA’, Sunday Times, 12 March 2017, available at https://www.pressreader.com/
south-africa/sunday-times/20170312/281840053470410.
186 Regulation 11(4) of the new Regulations requires an RSDO interview and assessment to take place prior to the 
issuance of an endorsement.
187 RA (as amended) s 22(8)(a).
188 RA s 22(6).
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shelter and basic necessities by the UNHCR or any other charitable organisation or person’.189 
Only if they cannot be provided for by such organisations or persons could they be potentially 
eligible for an endorsement of their right to work. Such endorsement would require them to 
produce a letter of employment within 14 days of taking up employment.190 It is an offence, 
punishable by up to R20 000 fine, to employ an asylum-seeker lacking an endorsement.191 
Finally, the DHA Director-General must revoke the endorsement if an employee is unable to 
prove that they are employed ‘after a period of six months from the date on which such right 
was endorsed.’192
The scheme imposes extremely harsh procedural conditions on employing asylum-seekers 
(it contains no specific reference to self-employment). Since asylum-seekers are now required 
to make an application for asylum within five days of entry into the Republic, and since their 
dependants have to be declared as part of the application, an asylum-seeker has five days to 
communicate with friends and family and obtain confirmation of their support before they 
lodge their application. They are denied the right to work whilst the initial assessment takes 
place. Implicitly, they will not receive an employment endorsement until and unless they 
can offer proof of a negative — that they cannot receive assistance from UNHCR or other 
organisations. There could thus be lengthy periods during which asylum-seekers would neither 
be able to self-sustain nor rely on others (let alone the state) for support, potentially leaving 
them destitute. Yet, the (modest) Watchenuka ratio — that SA cannot deny asylum-seekers 
both welfare support and access to gainful employment — remains compelling. Indeed, in 
its Concluding Observations, CESCR expressed concerns ‘that the right of asylum-seekers to 
work has been denied through Section 22(8)’193 and called on South Africa to ‘[e]nsure, to the 
fullest extent possible, that asylum seekers can support themselves and enjoy the right to work, 
including by amending [it]’.194
The above analysis demonstrates that the RAA 2017 clearly conflicts with previous courts’ 
judgments; but does it breach IRL? Article 17 of the 1951 Convention accords ‘refugees 
lawfully staying … the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country 
in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment’. Article 
18 accords ‘a refugee lawfully in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any 
event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, 
as regards the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and 
commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies’. Hence, IRL draws a 
temporal distinction between access to self-employment, which applies as soon as a refugee is 
‘lawfully in’ the country, and access to wage-earning employment, which is only required once 
a refugee is ‘lawfully staying’.
It is contended that the relevant interpretive premise should be that of asylum-seekers as 
‘presumptive refugees’ and of an asylum application rendering an asylum-seeker’s presence 
lawful. Even if SA had provided public relief to asylum-seekers, preventing their destitution, 
IRL would only permit time-limited restrictions on asylum-seekers’ access to wage-earning 
189 RA s 22(8)(b).
190 RA ss 22(8)(c), 22(9). A similar endorsement procedure is envisaged for exercising the right to study at a ‘relevant 
educational institution’.
191 RA s 22(10).
192 RA s 22(11).
193 ICESCR (note 26 above) at para 25.
194 Ibid at para 26(c).
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employment — whereas restrictions on self-employment are prima facie suspect.195 In Union 
of Refugee Women (discussed in part II), the majority rejected the argument that the relevant 
comparators for refugees and asylum-seekers in respect of access to wage-earning employment 
are favoured non-citizens (permanent residents),196 and hence rejected a constitutional claim 
based on unfair discrimination, even in respect of recognised refugees, let alone asylum-seekers. 
An IRL-focussed interpretation would have necessitated a different analysis.
The RAA 2017 excludes all asylum-seekers from all forms of self-employment and casual 
work, irrespective of whether they can self-sustain or rely on others. It also excludes all 
asylum-seekers who can either self-sustain or can be otherwise supported from wage-earning 
employment. These exclusions can last indefinitely, given the new regulations remove even 
the expectation of a timely assessment of asylum applications. Such blanket restrictions are 
arguably incompatible with IRL.
F  Restrictions of political activities
Regulation 4(2) stipulates that ‘no refugee or asylum seeker may participate in any political 
activity or campaign in furtherance of any political party or political interests in the Republic’. 
The regulations do not define ‘political activity, ‘campaign’ or indeed ‘political interests’.
Whereas IRL is silent on political rights,197 IHRL is not: the ICCPR protects the rights of 
‘everyone’198 to ‘freedom of expression’, of ‘peaceful assembly’, and to ‘freedom of association 
with others’.199 Concomitantly, signatories thereto are expected to prohibit ‘advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
195 Compare Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 Laying Down 
Standards for the Reception of Applicants for International Protection (Recast) art 15 (‘Employment’) which 
requires EU member states to ‘ensure that applicants have access to the labour market no later than 9 months 
from the date when the application for international protection was lodged if a first instance decision by the 
competent authority has not been taken and the delay cannot be attributed to the applicant’. It also notes that: 
‘Access to the labour market shall not be withdrawn during appeals procedures, where an appeal against a 
negative decision in a regular procedure has suspensive effect, until such time as a negative decision on the appeal 
is notified’. Importantly, the Directive requires member states to ‘ensure that material reception conditions are 
available to applicants when they make their application for international protection’ including ‘an adequate 
standard of living for applicants, which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental 
health’. Ibid art 17(2). For discussion, see A Edwards ‘Article 17’ in Zimmermann (note 123 above) ch 35 at 
para 34; A Edwards ‘Article 18’ in Zimmermann (note 123 above) ch 18 at para 10.
 Compare GS Goodwin‐Gill and J McAdam The Refugee in International Law (3rd Ed, 2007) 526(Suggests 
that, to meet the ‘lawfully staying’ threshold, refugees ‘must show something more than mere lawful presence’, 
such as ‘permanent, indefinite or unrestricted or other residence status, recognition as a refugee, issue of a travel 
document, or grant of re‐entry visa…any of these statuses will raise a strong presumption that the refugee should 
be lawfully staying in the contracting State, and it would then fall to the State to rebut the presumption by 
showing, for example, that the refugee was admitted for a limited time and purpose, or that he or she is in fact 
the responsibility of another State’).
196 Union of Refugee Women (note 103 above) at para 61.
197 1951 Convention art 5. See also Ziegler Voting Rights of Refugees (note 127 above) ch 2.
198 HRC General Comment No 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant 
(Adopted on 29th March 2004) (2187th meeting) at para 3 (‘the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited 
to citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, 
such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory 
or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party’).
199 Articles 19, 21, and 22 of the ICCPR, respectively.
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violence’ as well as ‘propaganda for war’.200 Therefore, in IHRL, asylum-seekers and refugees 
qua persons within SA’s territory and subject to its jurisdiction should enjoy ‘political 
communication’ rights there.
In turn, the prohibition on ‘subversive activities’ in the OAU Convention201 and the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights202 should be interpreted harmoniously with the ICCPR 
to denote ‘the overthrow of the legal, political and social order of the state which another state 
attempts or achieves by propagating its ideology amongst the political forces of the state which 
is the target of this undertaking’.203
The Constitution protects political communication rights of ‘everyone’, and restrictions 
are subject to the general (s 36) limitation clause. The enumerated rights are: ‘freedom of 
expression’ including ‘freedom to receive or impart information or ideas’;204 the right to 
‘peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions’;205 
and the right to ‘freedom of association’.206 Broadly consistent with the ICCPR, the scope 
of freedom of expression does not extend to ‘propaganda for war’, ‘incitement of imminent 
violence’, or ‘advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion, and that 
constitutes incitement to cause harm’.207
Meanwhile, citizens are guaranteed the right to vote in the Republic’s elections208 as well as 
the right ‘to form a political party’, ‘to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a 
political party’ and ‘to campaign for a political party or cause’.209 There is arguably an overlap 
between elements of ss 16–18 and of s 19: the ‘furtherance of a political interest or cause’ as 
per s 19(1) would often be pursued as part of the individual’s freedom to ‘impart information 
or ideas’ and may involve assemblies, demonstrations, and petitions, oftentimes exercising 
freedom of association. Therefore, it is argued that the reference in s 19 to ‘citizens’ should 
not be read to restrict non-citizens’ political communication rights, but rather to elucidate a 
holistic account of the self-governance rights that citizens enjoy in the Republic.210
SA courts have consistently held that the ‘bounds of the constitutional guarantee of free 
expression’ should be interpreted generously,211 given that ‘individuals in our society need to 
200 Ibid art 20.
201 Article 3 of the OAU Convention requires ‘every refugee’ to ‘abstain from any subversive activities against any 
Member State of the OAU’ and Signatory States ‘to prohibit refugees residing in their respective territories from 
attacking any State Member of the OAU, by any activity likely to cause tension between Member States, and 
in particular by use of arms, through the press, or by radio.’
202 Ibid art 23(2)(a) notes that ‘any individual enjoying the right of asylum … shall not engage in subversive 
activities against his country of origin or any other State Party to the present Charter; and that (b) their 
territories shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities against the people of any other State 
Party to the present Charter.’
203 Sharpe (note 6 above) at 82 (referencing E Mbaya ‘Political Asylum in the Charter of the OAU: Pretensions and 
Reality’ (1987) 35 Law & State 63, 74–75).
204 Constitution s 16(1).
205 Ibid s 17.
206 Ibid s 18.
207 Ibid s 16(2).
208 Ibid s 19(3)(a).
209 Ibid ss 19(1)(a) (b), and (c) respectively.
210 SA courts appear not to have directly addressed this interpretive question.
211 Laugh It Off Promotions v South African Breweries International (27 May 2005) at para 47. See also Masuku 
v South African Human Rights Commission [2018] ZASCA 180; 2019 (2) SA 194 (SCA); [2019] 1 All SA 608 
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be able to hear, form and express opinions and views freely on a wide range of matters’212 The 
Court quashed a provision prohibiting broadcasting of ‘material which is indecent or obscene 
or offensive to public morals or offensive to the religious convictions or feelings of any section 
of a population or likely to prejudice the safety of the State or the public order or relations 
between sections of the population’, holding that the provision ‘self-evidently limited the right 
to freedom of expression’.213 In Garvas, the Court held that ‘the right to freedom of assembly 
… exists primarily to give a voice to the powerless. This includes groups who do not have 
‘political or economic power, and other vulnerable persons … this right will, in many cases, be 
the only mechanism available to them to express their legitimate concerns’.214 In Mlungwana, 
the Court emphasised that the term ‘everyone’ … ‘must be interpreted to include every person 
or group of persons’.215
Pursuant both to SA’s international law obligations and to its Bill of Rights provisions, the 
rights that reg 4(2) restricts should be enjoyed by everyone in SA, including asylum-seekers 
and refugees. Elsewhere,216 I argue that, given their political predicament, asylum-seekers and 
refugees have a particularly strong claim to enjoy ‘political communication’ rights in their host 
country. Constitutionally, any restriction on ss 16–18 rights must clear the s 36 limitation 
clause hurdle — requiring a law of general application that is reasonable and justifiable in an 
‘open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom’. That reg 4(2) 
singles out asylum-seekers and refugees for adverse treatment (other non-citizens are spared), 
curtailing their autonomy and undermining their self-respect and dignity, may also give rise 
to a s 9 unfair discrimination claim.217
(SCA); (4 December 2018) at para 16(Refers to the Constitution’s ‘liberal approach to protection of freedom of 
expression’).
212 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC); 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) at 
para 7.
213 The Islamic Unity Convention v The Independent Broadcasting Authority [2002] ZACC 3; 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) 
(11 April 2002); discussed in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission [2019] ZASCA 167; [2020] 1 
All SA 325 (SCA); 2020 (2) SA 124 (SCA) (29 November 2019) at para 47.
214 South African Transport & Allied Workers Union v Garvas [2012] ZACC 13 (13 June 2002) at para 61.
215 Mlungwana & Others v S & Another [2018] ZACC 45; 2019 (1) SACR 429 (CC) (19 November 2018) at para 
43. See also J Duncan ‘South Africa’s Doctrinal Decline on the Right to Protest: Notification Requirements and 
the Shift from Fundamental Right to National Security Threat’ (2020) 10 Constitutional Court Review 227.
216 See, generally, R Ziegler ‘Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Association and Aliens’ Restrictions on their 
Political Activity (arts. 10, 11, 16, Art. 3 Prot. 1 ECHR)’ in D Moya & G Milios (eds) Aliens Before the European 
Court of Human Rights: Ensuring Minimum Standards of Human Rights Protection (forthcoming).
217 Constitution s 9(3): ‘the state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds including…’ For the equality clause tests see Harksen v Lane [1997] ZACC 12; 1998 (1) SA 300 
(CC). The list of grounds is non-exhaustive: whereas nationality/citizenship is not included, it can still form 
the basis of an unfair discrimination claim. See e.g. Khosa v Minister of Social Development [2004] ZACC 11; 
2004 (6) SA 505; 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (4 March 2004) at para 71(Finds exclusions of permanent residence 
from social welfare scheme to constitute unfair discrimination; the Court noted that acquisition of citizenship 
is subject to ministerial discretion and is, at least temporarily, a characteristic of personhood not alterable by 
conscious action and in some cases not alterable except on the basis of unacceptable costs). See also Larby-odam 
v Minister of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) [1997] ZACC 16; 1997 (12) BCLR 1655; 
1998 (1) SA 745 (26 November 1997) at para 24(Holds that denying permanent employment opportunities to 
permanent residents, who ‘can be said to have made a conscious commitment to South Africa’ constitutes unfair 
discrimination). For criteria for determining unfair discrimination on an unlisted ground see Hoffman v South 
African Airways [2000] ZACC 17; 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC).
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IV  PROSPECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Part III appraised the adverse effects of the RAA 2017 and its regulations on access to the SA 
asylum system and to substantive rights. It demonstrated that the impugned legislation, which 
defies judicial pronouncements, breaches SA’s treaty obligations.
This part briefly outlines three potential grounds (to the non-exclusion of others) for 
mounting constitutional challenges against the RAA 2017. First, the RAA 2017 renders the 
amended RA internally inconsistent. The amendments brought about by the RAA 2017 
breach IRL and IHRL treaty norms, yet the amended RA explicitly requires its interpretation 
to be consistent with such norms. Hence, by enacting the RAA 2017, Parliament acted 
irrationally and therefore unlawfully. Second, by restricting access to the asylum system and 
by denying asylum-seekers substantive rights they currently enjoy, the RAA 2017 violates their 
constitutional rights to, inter alia, just administrative action;218 freedom and security of the 
person;219 freedom of movement and residence;220 education;221 social security;222 freedom of 
expression, demonstration, picket, and petition, and association;223 as well as equality224 and 
human dignity.225 Third, the RAA 2017 is manifestly retrogressive and may therefore breach 
the state’s s 7(2) constitutional obligations to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ the Bill of 
Rights, interpreted in the light of the non-regression principle.
Section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution stipulates that any court must declare that any law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency. 
It is hoped that, courts will utilise IRL in their appraisal and declare relevant provisions 
unconstitutional.
A  Legislative inconsistency, rationality, and the principle of legality
The simultaneous commencement of the RAA 2008 and RAA 2017 modifies both the 
substantive norms and the interpretive framework for appraisal of the amended RA — pulling 
in opposite directions. Prior to the RAA 2017, s 6 of the RA instructed SA courts to interpret 
and give effect thereto ‘with due regard’ to enumerated instruments to which the Republic has 
become a party. This necessitated ‘serious consideration’ both of IRL instruments and of IHRL 
instruments, especially where it supplements IRL such as in respect of political communication 
rights. Part II demonstrated that such ‘serious consideration’ was generally absent hitherto 
from the Republic’s asylum jurisprudence. RAA 2008 replaced s 6 with s 1A: courts now must 
interpret and give effect to the RA ‘in a manner consistent with’ SA’s IRL & IHRL obligations 
218 Constitution s 33 (‘everyone has a right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair’) 
and s 3(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000 (‘administrative action which materially and 
adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair’).
219 Constitution s 12(1) (‘everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right (a) 
not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause’).
220 Ibid s 21(1) (‘everyone has the right to freedom of movement’).
221 Ibid s 29(1) (‘everyone has the right to (a) a basic education, including adult basic education; (b) further 
education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible’).
222 Ibid s 27(1)(c) (‘everyone has the right to have access to…social security, including, if they are unable to support 
themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance’).
223 Ibid ss 16–18 (text cited in part IIIF).
224 Ibid s 9 (text cited in part IIIF).
225 Ibid s 10 (text cited in part IIC).
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— which must therefore become the starting point for appraisal of the amended RA and of 
its new Regulations.
Yet, as this article has shown, parts of the amended RA cannot be interpreted in a manner 
that is consistent with IRL. For instance, each of the five additional exclusion clauses entails 
denial of refugee status to those who qualify as ‘refugees’ in IRL as defined in s 3 of the RA 
(refugee status). There is therefore a direct and irreconcilable conflict between s 4 of the RA 
(exclusion) and s 2 (nonrefoulement): a person who meets the s 3 refugee definition would be 
excluded from refugee status pursuant to s 4, but SA authorities would still be enjoined from 
expelling, extraditing or returning them to any country, given that s 2 applies ‘notwithstanding 
any provision of this Act or any other law to the contrary’. The inevitable outcome is having 
in SA excluded but non-removable persons whose legal status and rights are in limbo for an 
indefinite period.
The Court held that ‘the exercise of public power by the Executive and other functionaries’ 
must be ‘rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in 
effect arbitrary’.226 The RAA 2017 renders the RA internally inconsistent, forces the Executive 
to act irrationally, and is therefore at odds with the constitutional principle of legality.227
B  Substantive breaches of the Bill of Rights: beyond dignity
Section 7(2) of the Bill of Rights requires the state to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights’. As the Glenister judgment postulated, the binding nature 
of international law obligations on the Republic is most significant when interpreting the 
obligations under s 7(2).228 Implicit in it is the obligation that the steps taken to protect and 
fulfil constitutional rights must be reasonable.229 Section 8(1) postulates that the Bill of Rights 
‘applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state’. 
Parliament is not only obliged to refrain from interfering with fundamental rights but must 
give effect to them by positive action.
Section 36 of the Bill of Rights stipulates that rights ‘may be limited only in terms of law 
of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’. Relatedly, s 39(2) of 
the Bill of Rights requires courts interpreting any legislation to ‘promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights’ which are set out in s 7(1) — the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom.
The changes to the asylum regime outlined in part III violate substantive rights that asylum-
seekers enjoy, not just under IRL but also (as part II has shown), pursuant to judicial precedents 
under the Constitution (invoking the constitutional right to dignity). Whereas the fact that 
legislation violates IRL does not definitively settle the constitutional question, that is, whether 
226 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa & Another In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa [2000] ZACC 1, 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 79.
227 New National Party of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa [1999] ZACC 5, 1999 (3) SA 191. 
In Fedsure, the Court noted that ‘the principle of legality is necessarily implicit in the Constitution’. Fedsure Life 
Assurance Ltd & Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council [1998] ZACC 17, 1999 (1) SA 
374 (CC) at para 59.
228 Glenister (note 24 above) at para 189.
229 Ibid at para 194.
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the infringement of enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights is reasonable and justifiable, it 
provides a strong indication of the likelihood of that conclusion being reached in the appraisal.
C  Non-regression
The principle of non-regression in international law mandates that, once a country has acted to 
realise a right, it must at the least maintain the achieved standard of protection henceforth. As 
Sanya Samtani argues, while the Court in Law Society does not explicitly articulate a principle 
of non-retrogression (or non-regression) in SA law, it offered an account of what its application 
looks like in practice.230 For instance, in relation to the state’s obligation under s 7(2) of the 
Bill of Rights, ‘[t]he President’s power in terms of section 231(1) is permissibly exercisable only 
insofar as it is aimed at protecting, promoting, respecting and fulfilling the rights in the Bill 
of Rights … [t]here is just no room for deviation, particularly where citizens’ existing rights 
are likely to be undermined or extinguished at any level where they used to be enjoyed.’231 
The judgment also holds that ‘it is constitutionally impermissible, as long as our Constitution 
and the Treaty remain unchanged, for the President to align herself with and sign a regressive 
international agreement that seeks to take away the citizens’ right of access to justice at SADC 
level’.232
The RAA 2017 is manifestly retrogressive: it excludes ‘refugees’ within the meaning of 
the 1951 and OAU Conventions from receiving refugee status in SA; it renders abandoned 
asylum claims which under the existing protection regime would be assessed; it facilitates the 
establishment of APCs, de facto detention centres, whilst removing statutory times for assessing 
asylum claims; it denies asylum-seekers rights that they currently enjoy in respect of access to 
employment and education;233 it imposes new restrictions on political activities of both asylum-
seekers and refugees; and it renders refugee status, once granted, subject to additional cessation 
clauses and, hence, more precarious, and refugee integration significantly less likely. Each of 
these changes reflects a weakening of SA’s commitment to refugee protection. Taken together, 
they amount to a sea change in its asylum regime.
V  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Ratification and domestication of IRL treaties is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
ensuring effective refugee protection. Judiciaries must be able and willing to appraise legislation 
and executive actions to determine their compatibility with international standards. In some 
jurisdictions, the role of international norms in domestic constitutional arrangements is the 
source of ongoing contention: not so in SA, where an ‘international law friendly’ constitution 
230 S Samtani ‘International Law, Access to Courts and Non-Retrogression: Law Society v President of RSA’ (2020) 
10 Constitutional Court Review 197.
231 Law Society (note 17 above) at para 78.
232 Ibid at para 82.
233 For example, International Commission of Jurists Promoting Non-Citizens’ Right to Work in South Africa (April 
2020) 43–44 (Recognises the possibility of restrictions and limitations being placed on non-citizens’ rights, 
including the right to work, while affirming clearly that ‘any restrictions, including a qualification period, must 
be proportionate and reasonable’ and that ‘differential measures taken by the State in relation to economic, social 
and cultural rights should not be retrogressive’), available at https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
South-Africa-Non-Citizens-Right-to-Work-Advocacy-Analysis-Brief-2020-ENG-.pdf (referencing CESCR 
General Comment No. 19: The right to social security (Art. 9 of the Covenant) (4 February 2008) E/C.12/GC/19, 
available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/47b17b5b39c.html at para 37).
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requires courts to consider international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights and to adopt 
reasonable interpretations that are compatible with international law whenever they interpret 
legislation. Enter refugee protection, where the legislation domesticating SA’s international 
obligations has hitherto mandated interpretive ‘due regard’ to IRL and international human 
rights instruments.
In their jurisprudence, courts have generally resisted the Executive’s repeated efforts to 
frustrate asylum-seekers’ rights, finding them to be against the spirit and the letter of the 
RA. Their judgments acknowledge that, without effective access to rights and absent welfare 
support, asylum-seekers will be destitute, which would violate their constitutional right to 
human dignity. Over the past two decades, courts have attempted to bridge the gap between 
designation of persons as ‘illegal foreigners’ under the IA and the protection from refoulement 
that they enjoy under the RA. Yet, I have shown in this article that SA courts have under-utilised 
IRL norms, rarely articulating an IRL rationale for their judgments. Crucially, they have not 
challenged the normatively flawed core premise of (many) Executive policies: namely that, in 
its eyes, despite the express language of s 1(v) of the RA, refugee status is constitutive of rights, 
rather than declaratory.
The RAA 2017 forces a direct clash between the promise of the RA and its (amended) 
legal reality. Coupled with the RAA 2008 induced requirement, pursuant to s 1A, to interpret 
and give effect to the RA ‘in a manner consistent with’ IRL, courts will soon be called upon 
to pronounce on overt breaches of IRL in primary and secondary legislation that cannot be 
reconciled with the SA’s international obligations. The time is ripe.
